

APRIL 12, 2004

The American Conservative

How our first Christians shaped the nation's culture

A painting depicting a group of Puritans in 17th-century attire gathered around a table outdoors. A man in clerical robes stands in the center, praying with his hands clasped. Other people, including men, women, and children, are seated around the table, some with their hands clasped in prayer. The background shows a landscape with a body of water and distant hills. The overall tone is solemn and religious.

How our first Christians shaped the nation's culture

By Samuel P. Huntington

**Abusing the Holocaust
Taki on the Spanish Vote
Juicing the Summer Game**



Abusing the Holocaust Taki on the Spanish Vote Juicing the Summer Game



THE AMERICAN IMPERIUM

A conference co-hosted by
the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and *Current History* magazine.

How do we characterize the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century? If the United States is not an empire, what is it? If we cannot call our foreign policies "imperial," what are they?

In recent months, scholars and policy makers have debated the perils and promise of an American Empire. Some argue that the United States has always been an empire, and that we are only now coming to terms with our imperial status. Others argue that the Founders opposed empire on moral and practical grounds, and that empire runs contrary to deeply held American traditions and values.

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Keynote Address "The American Imperium"
John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

**Panel I - International Reactions
to American Empire**

Panelists:

Seyom Brown, Brandeis University
Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago
Leon Hadar, The Cato Institute
Rajan Menon, Lehigh University
James Kurth, Swarthmore College, Moderator

**Panel II - The American Empire in Context:
Past, Present, and Future**

Panelists:

David C. Hendrickson, Colorado College
David Isenberg, British American Security
Information Council
Stanley Kober, The Cato Institute
John Peterson, The Arlington Institute
Christopher A. Preble, Coalition for a Realistic
Foreign Policy, Moderator

Conference Co-Chairs:

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Foreign Policy, 202/218-4630
Bill Finan, Editor, *Current History*, 215/482-4464

Monday, April 19, 2004 · 1:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Science Center, Auditorium 101 · Swarthmore College · Swarthmore, Pennsylvania



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American Creed

BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON Would America be the America it is today if it had not been settled by British Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portugese Catholics? No. It would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil. **Page 8**

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
[TERROR]

WHO LOST SPAIN?

After the 9/11 attacks, for one brief, brilliant moment, the United States enjoyed enormous global support. The French newspaper *Le Monde* spoke on behalf of people of goodwill all around the world when, the day after the destruction of the World Trade Center, it ran a lead editorial proclaiming "We Are All Americans." There were, to be sure, malcontents who chose to pervert the moment by criticizing America in her hour of mourning, but such petulance was the exception to the rule. After 9/11, the world rallied around America.

So how did Americans react when an ally, Spain, suffered a devastating terror bombing that left some 200 dead? The reaction among the partisan press that supported the Iraq War was not to express solidarity with the Spanish people but to blame them for voting the wrong way in the elections the week after the atrocity. The weblog of one hawkish American publication carried remarks like "Appeasement and shame, thy name is Spain," and "[the election] shows that Europeans are willing to be cowed by terror into voting for appeasers."

Before the bombings, Spanish polls had the Popular Party, which had supported the Iraq War, ahead of the Socialists who had opposed it. The terrorist attack was widely perceived, in Spain and around the world, as affecting the course of the election. It is worth remembering, however, that Prime Minister Aznar's support for the Iraq War was enormously unpopular with the electorate at the time. The bombings did not change the Spanish people's mind about the war; they only brought the issue back to the fore. Moreover, who could have imagined that after such an atrocity the course of the election would remain the same? Whether the attack had helped the Popular Party or, as it did in fact, the opposition Socialists, it would



have been a tremendous influence.

From casting doubts upon the loyalty of their fellow citizens, America's hawks have now decided to define what proper Spanish patriotism should be, and have labeled the electoral choice of the plurality of the Spanish people as "appeasers." Is it any wonder that America has lost so many friends in so short a time?

[BELTWAY]

VETTING THE VEEP

A striking element of Errol Morris's "Fog of War" is the taped conversations between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and various cabinet members, unrehearsed and seemingly unconscious of the world beyond, an intimate window into history at the top: a reluctant McNamara, in exquisite boardroom language, telling Johnson (in 1964!) that the Vietnam War couldn't be won and yet acceding to Johnson's wishes for escalation; Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, whose deferentially phrased "I don't agree, Mr. President" may have saved us and the Russians from mutual annihilation during the Cuban missile crisis.

The tapes made us wonder how history will record the conversations of CIA chief George Tenet, tasked with correcting President Bush and Vice President Cheney for their many false statements about Iraq and its weapons capabilities. Tenet told a Senate committee last week that he had to correct Cheney on several occasions—the vice president suffers from a seemingly irrepressible impulse to assert things in public that are unsupported by intelligence data. Still high on Tenet's to-do list was calling Cheney's attention to yet another "misstatement," made about two months ago, concerning Saddam's purported ties to al-Qaeda. Apparently this is one CIA-director duty that screams for procrastination. "Mr. Vice President, what you said last January about Saddam and al-Qaeda, well sir, that simply isn't true, according to our best estimates." Cheney: "I'll say what I damn well want to say about Iraq—you know what you can do with your intelligence estimates." Watergate and all, there probably are not accurate records of these conversations. Too bad.

[POLITICS]

DELAY REACTION

Slowly but surely signs of discontent are starting to surface in conservative ranks. First, syndicated columnist Robert Novak reported that some unnamed Republicans were buzzing that it would not necessarily be a bad thing for the conservative agenda if John Kerry defeated President Bush.

Then House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, in an unprecedented move, announced his own legislative goals for the year and beyond, independent both of the Bush administration and the GOP congressional leadership of which he is a part. Although he consulted House Speaker Dennis Hastert, the Texas congressman had “no intention” of running his plans by the White House. DeLay outlined his “Conservative Blueprint for Success” in a meeting of the House Republican Conference.

DeLay’s blueprint is broken up into the broad categories of “family, prosperity and security.” Much of it contains familiar Washington conservative items—a proposal to double economic output in 15 years through tax cuts, and increased tolerance for religious symbols in the public square. Neglected items like curtailing immigration and reining in reckless interventionism were conspicuous by their absence.

This much is evident from DeLay’s latest gambit: conservatives are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with what they are getting from the Bush administration.

[CULTURE]

NEWSPEAK 2004

“Grandfather clause” is sexist. “Master bedroom” is racist. “Landlord” is elitist. So say the cultural commissars who with astonishing speed have scrubbed Scripture (Son of Man is retranslated Holy One), purged curricula (penmanship contains the dread male referent),

and rewritten pop culture. A new college text on human development reads, “As a folksinger once sang, how many roads must an individual walk down before you can call them an adult.” Few would connect that ungrammatical nonsense with Bob Dylan’s signature, “How many roads must a man walk down before you call him a man?”

So reports Diane Ravitch, author of *The Language Police*, in a recent *Wall Street Journal* essay. “[What] began with the hope of encouraging diversity ... has evolved into a bureaucratic system that removes all evidence of diversity and reduces everyone to interchangeable beings whose differences we must not learn about...”

She singles out the New York school system for particular ridicule. The state guidelines ask, “Is it necessary to make reference to a person’s age, ancestry, disability, ethnicity, nationality, physical appearance, race, religion, sex, sexuality?” Most often the answer is no—so history and literature are stripped, and their characters are left lacking motivation, context, and intrigue. On the New York State Education Department’s hit list: illegal alien (undocumented worker); American (citizen of the United States or North America); elderly (older person); handyman and hostess, illegitimate and ghetto (avoid altogether). The result is no Third World—at least in print—but no masterpieces either.

[DIPLOMACY]

RANDOM REPRISAL

“It is starting to look more and more like the terrorist attack in Spain was the work of al-Qaeda. Today President Bush called the Prime Minister of Spain to offer his condolences and said, ‘If it makes you feel any better, we will be happy to attack a country that had nothing to do with it.’”

—Bill Maher, “Real Time,” HBO, 3/12/04

[CULTURE]

RED LIGHT GREEN

When Bill Gates’s bride visited Kolkata, India recently, she headed for a place few would expect: the city’s largest red-light district. She spent three hours there—and \$200 million.

The recipient of the Gates Foundation’s largesse is a sex-workers union well known to local authorities. On Jan. 13, when policemen raided a brothel on a tip that a 14-year-old child prostitute was being held against her will, hundreds of sex workers besieged them. Six policemen were injured before the girl was rescued and her captor was arrested. Now Melinda Gates is taking the side of the mob.

The Foundation’s concern about the spread of HIV/AIDS is legitimate—4.5 million Indians are infected. But some other numbers might also interest Mr. and Mrs. Microsoft: India has 2.3 million prostitutes, 30 percent of whom are children. Girls between 9 and 15 are most desirable. They are bought in their villages for between \$50-\$90 and brought to the cities where they turn an average of six tricks per day. A dozen may live in a windowless 10x10 room; by some perverse blessing, few live long.

Aid workers, relief organizations, and the Indian government are working to end this travesty. But the sex-workers union, the Durbar Mahila Samanway Committee, resists every effort—and now has considerable resources at its disposal.

Benevolence is admirable, but myopia is not. The guild Bill and Melinda Gates are subsidizing has no problem taking money to give condoms to children. Slowing the spread of AIDS protects its investment. But health concerns can’t be compartmentalized from the union’s human trade. The Gateses should realize this—and wonder just who they have gotten into bed with.

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[IMMIGRATION]

DISCRIMINATION WORSE THAN WAR

On the morning of the Madrid horror, Robert Leiken of the Nixon Center was introducing his new monograph on immigration and national security. Al-Qaeda does have an “immigration strategy” he told us, and its members use every possible immigration category to infiltrate Western countries, especially the U.S.

Al-Qaeda has shown a preference for securing proper documents for immigrating legally—which makes the visa process of great strategic importance. One particular case of American vulnerability is terrorists from “visa waiver” countries, like Zacharias Moussaoui (who came from France) and shoe bomber Richard Reid (from Britain), which do not require a visa for travel to the United States. American officials have no right to interview such travelers or to perform background checks prior to their getting on a plane.

Leiken was asked why the U.S. could not simply say that the “visa waiver” system is not working as far as Europe’s Muslims are concerned and that background checks and interviews will henceforth be required. Certainly after 9/11, no one from an Arab country is automatically granted a visa. Well, he replied, it would be discriminatory. The Europeans would object, American liberals would object, and you can’t fight the War on Terror without broad support.

Here was the upside-down world of official Washington in its purest form: it is considered perfectly rational to attack and occupy foreign countries with hardly a glance at international law. But it is somehow recklessly extremist to suggest an immigration regulation whose most disagreeable consequence might be that travelers have to wait a few days for a visa. Apparently that would infringe upon the civil liberties of

Muslim tourists and insult the Europeans—a violation of everything America stands for.

[MEDIA]

JAYSON BLAIR, CALL YOUR OFFICE

The *Wall Street Journal’s* commitment to open borders is well known—as is the paper’s refusal to tolerate real debate on immigration issues in its opinion pages. But last week, the *Journal’s* editorial page reached for and arrived at a new low.

It published a piece by its senior editorial writer, Jason Riley, intended to defame an important voice of the immigration-reform movement. Riley’s target was, in his words, the “repugnant” Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), a Washington-based think tank to which he attributed the following views: support of China’s one-child policy; support of the abortion pill RU-486; support for a target U.S. population of 150 million.

Were such claims true, they would indeed say something about the politics of CIS. As it happens, they are fabrications, made up out of whole cloth. We know CIS well. The independent group publishes sober and well-researched studies on all aspects of immigration, while taking no position on matters extraneous to its field. It favors a moderate slow-down in legal immigration for reasons familiar to most of our readers.

The publication of Riley’s slander says one of two things about the *Journal*: either the paper finds its open-borders immigration position so beleaguered and difficult to defend by rational argument that its editors have decided they have no choice but to invent positions for their opponents. Or journalistic standards at the editorial page are so loose that fabrications can easily find their way into its pages, without rudimentary editing or fact-checking. ■

Suicide by Free Trade

They are calling it “the jobs issue.” For 43 straight months, manufacturing jobs have disappeared. One in six has vanished since Bush took his oath. Now Americans are

alarmed over reports of the outsourcing of white-collar jobs. It is an issue on which the presidential election could turn.

And what has been the response of the candidates? Kerry is denouncing executives who move plants overseas as “Benedict Arnold CEOs,” and Bush is echoing his father’s rants against “isolationism and protectionism.”

“Some politicians in Washington want to build a wall around the country and to isolate America from the rest of the world,” said Bush in Ohio. “The old policy of economic isolationism is a recipe for economic disaster. America has moved beyond that tired defeatist mindset ...”

Both candidates and both parties seem clueless about what is going on and what to do about it. For Bush Republicans and Kerry Democrats both backed NAFTA, GATT, the WTO, and MFN for China.

There is this difference, however. Republicans are principled free traders, while the Democratic Party, as a wag put it a while ago, is simply a gathering of warring tribes that have come together in the anticipation of common plunder.

Democrats worship power. They will do what they must to get it. Thus they have begun to drop the free-trade mantra and play to the populism of the people. And they have tapped into the public mood. *USA Today* cites a University of Maryland poll that reveals that, “among Americans making more than \$100,000 a year, support for actively promoting free trade collapsed from 57 percent to less than half that, 28 percent.”

This is the first time this has happened.

If President Bush is going to spend eight months as a traveling salesman for free trade and a crusader against “protectionism,” as his father did, he is inviting the same result his father got.

An opportunist is to be preferred to an ideologue who will not entertain the idea he may be wrong and that the philosophy in which he was schooled and devoutly believes may be irrelevant to the new era. Like companies that continue to make products no one wants to buy anymore, parties that persist in policies that are visibly failing—like LBJ in Vietnam—end up being abandoned.

If the GOP persists in this free-trade fanaticism, it is courting suicide. For the policy is not working in the eyes of the people. And if Republicans insist the returns from global free trade—a disintegrating dollar and a merchandise trade deficit of \$550 billion a year and rising—are good for America, folks are going to conclude that Republicans are too out of it to govern.

Given that the GOP today controls both Houses of Congress and the White House, this may sound alarmist. Yet GOP dominance today does not approach what it was in the 1920s under Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, before the wipeout.

If the GOP does not offer ideas to halt the de-industrialization of America and the hemorrhaging of blue- and white-collar jobs, it is going to wind up on a landfill.

The problem with the columnists and think-tank scribblers who make up the

intelligentsia of the GOP is not that they believe in free markets but that they worship them. They believe that if NAFTA, GATT, the WTO, and MFN for China mean production goes overseas, the market is telling us where production ought to be. And the voice of the market is to be obeyed, because that is the voice of their god.

When Reagan, a devout free trader, saw the U.S. auto industry sinking, he did not let ideology interfere with a rescue. He imposed quotas on imported Japanese cars and saved Detroit, though he was denounced for apostasy and heresy.

Free-trade Republicans are like militant Christian Scientists who prefer to let patients die rather than call in a doctor—which is fine, as long as you’re not the patient.

Americans believe that the interests of U.S. workers and their families come ahead of what may be good or best for the Global Economy. For years they have seen industrial jobs disappear. Now white-collar jobs are being outsourced. They want to know what Bush and the Republicans are going to do about it.

If the president’s answer is to echo his father and denounce opponents as “isolationists and protectionists,” he risks ending up like his father, a one-term president.

Indeed, if the issue is jobs, Republicans ought to be thrown out. For not only are they not creating them, they have no idea how to stop exporting them. In their hearts, some of them think it a good thing. They are like the doctors of old who sincerely believed bleeding the patient was the way to get rid of the disease because that is what their textbooks and wise men told them. ■

[protestant formation]

American Creed

How our spiritual heritage shaped our national identity

By Samuel P. Huntington

MOST COUNTRIES HAVE a core or mainstream culture shared to varying degrees by most people in their society. Subordinate cultures usually exist involving subnational or, on occasion, transnational groups defined by religion, race, ethnicity, region, class, or other categories that people feel give them something in common. America has always had its full share of subcultures. It also has had a mainstream Anglo-Protestant culture in which most of its people, whatever their subcultures, have shared. For almost four centuries this culture of the founding settlers has been the central and the lasting component of American identity. One has only to ask: Would America be the America it is today if in the 17th and 18th centuries it had been settled not by British Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics? The answer is no. It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil.

America's Anglo-Protestant culture has combined political and social institutions and practices inherited from England, including most notably the English language, together with the concepts and values of dissenting

Protestantism, which faded in England but which the settlers brought with them and which took on new life on the new continent. At the beginning, as Alden T. Vaughan has said, "almost everything was fundamentally English: the forms of land ownership and cultivation, the system of government and the basic format of laws and legal procedures, the choices of entertainment and leisure-time pursuits, and innumerable other aspects of colonial life." Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concurs: "the language of the new nation, its laws, its institutions, its political ideas, its literature, its customs, its precepts, its prayers, primarily derived from Britain."

With adaptations and modifications, this original culture persisted for 300 years. Two hundred years after John Jay in 1789 identified six central elements Americans had in common, one of these, common ancestry, no longer existed. Several of the five others—language, religion, principles of government, manners and customs, war experience—had been modified or diluted (e.g., by the "same religion," Jay undoubtedly meant Protestantism, which 200 years later would have to be modified to Christianity). Yet

in their fundamentals, Jay's components of American identity, although challenged, still were central to American culture in the 20th century.

With respect to language, the efforts of 18th-century German settlers in Pennsylvania to make German the equal of English infuriated Benjamin Franklin, among others, and did not succeed. The efforts of 19th-century German immigrants to maintain German-speaking enclaves in Wisconsin and to use German in schools eventually came to naught as a result of pressures for assimilation and the Wisconsin legislature in 1889 requiring schools to use English as their language of instruction. Until the appearance of large concentrations of Spanish-speaking immigrants in Miami and the Southwest, America was unique as a huge country of more than 200 million people virtually all speaking the same language.

The political and legal institutions the settlers created in the 17th and 18th centuries embodied in large part the institutions and practices of England's late 16th-century and early 17th-century "Tudor constitution." These included: the concept of a fundamental law superior to



CHRIS HEERS

and limiting government; the fusion of executive, legislative, and judicial functions and the division of power among separate institutions and governments; the relative power of the legislature and chief executive; the merger of “dignified” and “efficient” functions in the chief executive; a two-house legislature; the responsibility of legislators to their local constituencies; a legislative committee system; and primary reliance for defense on militia rather than a standing army.

During the 19th century and until the late 20th century, immigrants were in various ways compelled, induced, and persuaded to adhere to the central elements of the Anglo-Protestant culture. Twentieth-century cultural pluralists, multiculturalists, and spokesmen for ethnic and racial minorities testify to the success of these efforts. Southern and eastern European immigrants, Michael Novak poignantly commented in 1977, were pressured to become “American” by adapting to Anglo-

American culture: Americanization “was a process of vast psychic repression.” In similar language, Will Kymlicka in 1995 argued that prior to the 1960s, immigrants “were expected to shed their distinctive heritage and assimilate entirely to existing cultural norms,” which he labeled the “Anglo-conformity model.” If they were thought incapable of assimilation, like the Chinese, they were excluded. In 1967, Harold Cruse declared, “America is a nation that lies to itself about who and what it is. It is a nation of minorities ruled by a minority of one—it thinks and acts as if it were a nation of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants.”

These critics are right. Throughout American history, people who were not white Anglo-Saxon Protestants have become Americans by adopting America’s Anglo-Protestant culture and political values. This benefited them and the country. American national identity and unity, as Benjamin C. Schwarz has said, derived

... from the ability and willingness of an Anglo elite to stamp its image on other peoples coming to this country. That elite’s religious and political principles, its customs and social relations, its standards of taste and morality, were for 300 years America’s, and in basic ways they still are, despite our celebration of ‘diversity.’ Whatever freedom from ethnic and nationalist conflict this country has enjoyed (and it has been considerably less than our national mythology would have us believe) has existed thanks to a cultural and ethnic predominance that would not tolerate conflict or confusion regarding the national identity.

Millions of immigrants and their children achieved wealth, power, and status in American society precisely because they assimilated themselves into the prevailing American culture. Hence there is no validity to the claim that

Americans have to choose between a white, WASPish ethnic identity, on the one hand, and an abstract, shallow civic identity dependent on commitment to certain political principles, on the other. The core of their identity is the culture that the settlers created, which generations of immigrants have absorbed, and which gave birth to the American Creed. At the heart of that culture has been Protestantism.

"The Dissidence of Dissent"

America was founded as a Protestant society and for 200 years almost all Americans were Protestant. With the substantial Catholic immigration first from Germany and Ireland and then Italy and Poland, the proportion of Protestants declined fairly steadily. By 2000, about 60 percent of Americans were Protestants. Protestant beliefs, values, and assumptions, however, had been the core element, along with the English language, of America's settler culture, and that culture continued to pervade and shape American life, society, and thought as the proportion of Protestants declined. Because they are central to American culture, Protestant values deeply influenced Catholicism and other religions in America. They have shaped American attitudes toward private and public morality, economic activity, government, and public policy. Most importantly, they are the primary source of the American Creed, the ostensibly secular political principles that supplement Anglo-Protestant culture as the critical defining element of what it means to be American.

In the early 17th century, as Adrian Hastings has said, Christianity was the "shaper of nations, even of nationalisms," and states and countries explicitly defined themselves as Protestant or Catholic. In Europe, existing societies accepted or rejected the Protestant

Reformation. In America, the Reformation created a new society. Unique among countries, America is the child of that Reformation. Without it there would be no America as we have known it. The origins of America, I have argued, "are to be found in the English Puritan Revolution." In America, the 19th century Swiss visitor Philip Schaff observed, "every thing had a Protestant beginning."

Its Protestant origins make America unique among nations and help explain why religion is central to American identity. America, said Tocqueville in an oft-quoted phrase, "was born equal and hence did not have to become so." More significantly, America was born Protestant and did not have to become so. America was thus not founded, as Louis Hartz argued, as a "liberal," "Lockean," or "Enlightenment" fragment of Europe. It was founded as a succession of Protestant fragments, a process under way in 1632 when Locke was born. Scholars who attempt to identify the American "liberal consensus" or Creed solely with Lockean ideas and the Enlightenment are giving a secular interpretation to the religious sources of American values.

beachhead in Maryland. Religious intensity was undoubtedly greatest among the Puritans, especially in Massachusetts. They took the lead in defining their settlement based on "a Covenant with God" to create "a city on a hill." In the 17th and 18th centuries, Americans defined their mission in the New World in biblical terms. They were a "chosen people," on an "errand in the wilderness," creating "the new Israel" or the "new Jerusalem" in what was clearly "the promised land." America was the site of a "new Heaven and a new earth, the home of justice," God's country.

American Protestantism differs from European Protestantism, particularly those denominations, Anglican or Lutheran, that have involved established churches. This difference was noted by Edmund Burke, who contrasted the fear, awe, duty, and reverence Englishmen felt toward political and religious authorities with the "fierce spirit of liberty" among Americans. This spirit, he argued, was rooted in the distinctively American brand of Protestantism. The Americans "are Protestants, and of that kind which is the most averse to all implicit submission of mind and opin-

RELIGION WAS A PREDOMINANT MOTIVE IN THE **CREATION OF COLONIES.**

VIRGINIA HAD "RELIGIOUS ORIGINS." QUAKERS AND METHODISTS SETTLED IN **PENNSYLVANIA.** CATHOLICS ESTABLISHED A BEACHHEAD IN **MARYLAND.**

The settling of America was, of course, a result of economic and other motives, as well as religious ones. Yet religion still was central. Although less important in New York and the Carolinas, religion was a predominant motive in the creation of the other colonies. Virginia, as Jon Butler says, had "religious origins." Quakers and Methodists settled in Pennsylvania. Catholics established a

ion. All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance: it is the dissidence of dissent, and the protestantism of the Protestant religion."

This dissidence was manifest from the first with the settlements of the Pilgrims and the Puritans in New England.

The Puritan message, style, and assumptions, if not doctrines, spread throughout the colonies and became absorbed into the beliefs and outlooks of other Protestant groups. In some measure, as Tocqueville said, “the entire destiny of America” was shaped by the Puritans. The “religious zeal and the religious conscience” of New England, James Bryce agreed, in “large measure passed into the whole nation.” Qualified, modified, diffused, the Puritan legacy became the American essence. While “England had a Puritan Revolution without creating a Puritan society, America created a Puritan society without enduring a Puritan revolution.”

The dissidence of American Protestantism, manifested first in Puritanism and congregationalism, reappeared in subsequent centuries in Baptist, Methodist, pietist, fundamentalist, evangelical, Pentecostal, and other types of Protestantism. These movements differed greatly. They were, however, generally committed to an emphasis on the individual’s direct relation to God, the supremacy of the Bible as the sole source of God’s word, salvation through faith and, for many, the transforming experience of being “born again,” personal responsibility to proselytize and bear witness, and democratic and participatory church organization. Beginning in the 18th century, American Protestantism became increasingly populist and less hierarchical and increasingly emotional and less intellectual. Doctrine gave way to passion. Sects and movements multiplied constantly, the dissenting sects of one generation then being challenged by the new dissidents of the next generation. “Dissidence of dissent” describes the history as well as the character of American Protestantism.

Evangelicalism, in various manifestations, has been central to American Protestantism. From the beginning,

America was, in the phrase of the University of Chicago historian Martin Marty, an “evangelical empire.” In the early 19th century, sects, preachers, and adherents exploded in number. “Young men of relentless energy,” as the historian Nathan Hatch has said, “went about movement-building as self-conscious outsiders. They shared an ethic of unrelenting toil, a passion for expansion, a hostility to orthodox belief and style, a zeal for religious reconstruction, and a systematic plan to realize their ideals. ... They all offered common people, especially the poor, compelling

“DISSIDENCE OF DISSENT” DESCRIBES THE HISTORY AS WELL AS THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM.

visions of individual self-respect and collective self-confidence.” “The history of American Evangelicism is then more than a history of a religious movement,” William McLoughlin, the leading scholar of Great Awakenings, agrees. “To understand it is to understand the whole temper of American life in the nineteenth century.”

Much the same could be said of the late 20th century. In the 1980s, slightly less than one-third of Americans said they were “born-again” Christians, including a majority of Baptists, about one-third of Methodists, and more than a quarter of Lutherans and Presbyterians. In 1999, roughly 39 percent of Americans said they were born again. Evangelicalism was also winning many converts among America’s largest immigrant group, Latin American Catholics. Evangelical students were also becoming increasingly numerous at elite universities. As the new millennium began, dissenting Protestantism and evangelicalism were continuing to play central roles in meeting the spiritual needs of Americans.

The American Creed

The term “the American Creed” was popularized by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944 in *The American Dilemma*. Pointing to the racial, religious, ethnic, regional, and economic heterogeneity of the United States, he argued that Americans had “something in common: a social ethos, a political creed,” which he labeled the American Creed. His term has been accepted as the common label for a phenomenon that had been noted by many earlier commentators, and which both

foreign and American observers have identified as a key element of American identity and often as the only significant determinant of that identity.

Scholars have defined the concepts of the Creed in various ways, but they almost universally agree on its central ideas. Myrdal spoke of “the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and a fair opportunity.” Tocqueville found people throughout America agreeing on “liberty and equality, the liberty of the press, the right of association, the jury, and the responsibility of the agents of government.” In the 1890s, Bryce summed up the political beliefs of Americans as including the sacred rights of the individual, the people as the source of political power, government limited by law and the people, a preference for local over national government, majority rule, and “the less government the better.” In the 20th century, Daniel Bell pointed to “individualism, achievement and equality of opportunity” as central values of the Creed and highlighted

the extent to which in America, “the tension between liberty and equality, which framed the great philosophical debates in Europe, was dissolved by an individualism which encompassed both.” Seymour Martin Lipset identified five key principles as its core: liberty, egalitarianism (of opportunity and respect, not result or condition), individualism, populism, and laissez-faire.

The principles of the Creed have three outstanding characteristics. First, they have remained remarkably stable over time. Second, until the late 20th century, the Creed also commanded the widespread agreement and support of the American people, however practice might deviate from it. The only major exception was the effort in the South to formulate a justification for slavery. Third, almost all the central ideas of the Creed have their origins in dissenting Protestantism. The Protestant emphasis on the individual conscience and the responsibility of individuals to learn God’s truths directly from the Bible promoted American commitment to individualism, equality, and the rights to

from revolutionary France, or in French, Spanish, or Portuguese colonies, or even in subsequent British colonies in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Muslim, Buddhist, Orthodox, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Catholic, and even Lutheran and Anglican cultures have produced nothing comparable. The American Creed is the unique creation of a dissenting Protestant culture. The extent, the fervor, and the continuity with which Americans have embraced the Creed testify to its place as an indispensable part of their national character and identity.

The sources of the Creed include the Enlightenment ideas that became popular among some American elites in the mid-18th century. These ideas, however, found receptive ground in the Anglo-Protestant culture that had already existed in America for over a century. Of central importance in that culture were long-standing English ideas of natural and common law, the limits of government authority, and the rights of Englishmen going back to Magna Carta. To these, the more radical Puritan sects of

in short, is Protestantism without God, the secular credo of the “nation with the soul of a church.”

Individualism and the Work Ethic

Protestantism in America generally involves a belief in the fundamental opposition of good and evil, right and wrong. Americans are far more likely than Canadians, Europeans, and Japanese, as Lipset said, to believe that “There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil” applicable “whatever the circumstances” rather than to believe that no such guidelines exist and what is good or evil depends on circumstances.

Most Protestant sects emphasize the role of the individual in achieving knowledge of God directly from the Bible without intermediation by clerical hierarchy. Many denominations also emphasize that the individual achieves salvation or is “born again” as a result of the grace of God, also without clerical intermediation. Success in this world places on the individual the responsibility to do good. “Protestantism, republicanism, and individualism are all one,” as F.J. Grund observed of America in 1837.

Their Protestant culture has made Americans the most individualistic people in the world. In Geert Hofstede’s comparative analysis of 116,000 employees of IBM in 39 countries, for instance, the mean individualism index was 51. Americans, however, were far above that mean, ranking first with an index of 91, followed by Australia, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Eight of the ten countries with the highest individualism indices were Protestant. A survey of cadets in military academies in 14 countries produced comparable results, with those from the United States, Canada, and Denmark ranking highest in individualism. The 1995–97 World Values Survey asked

PROTESTANTISM STRESSED THE **WORK ETHIC** AND THE **RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL** FOR HIS OWN **SUCCESS OR FAILURE** IN LIFE.

freedom of religion and opinion. Protestantism stressed the work ethic and the responsibility of the individual for his own success or failure in life. With its congregational forms of church organization, Protestantism fostered opposition to hierarchy and the assumption that similar democratic forms should be employed in government. It also promoted moralistic efforts to reform society and to secure peace and justice at home and throughout the world.

Nothing like the Creed was created in continental European societies apart

the English Revolution added equality and the responsiveness of government to the people. Religion in America, as William Lee Miller has observed, “helped to make the creed and was compatible with it Here liberal Protestantism and political liberalism, democratic religion and democratic politics, American faith and Christian faith, penetrated each other and exerted a profound influence upon each other.” As Jeff Spinner observed, “It’s difficult to disentangle what is Protestant from what is liberal in the United States.” The American Creed,

people in 48 countries whether individuals or the state should be primarily responsible for their welfare. Americans (with Swedes) came in close seconds to Swiss in emphasizing individual responsibility. In a survey of 15,000 managers in several countries, the Americans scored the highest on individualism, Japanese the lowest, with Canadians, British, Germans, and French between them in that order. The authors of the study concluded: "American managers are by far the strongest individualists in our national samples. They are also more inner-directed. Americans believe you should 'make up your mind' and 'do your own thing' rather than allow yourself to be influenced too much by other people and the external flow of events."

The American Protestant belief in individual responsibility gave rise to the gospel of success and the concept of the self-made man. "It was Anglo-Saxon Protestants," as Robert Bellah says, "who created the gospel of wealth and the ideal of success." The concept of the self-made man came to the fore in the Jacksonian years, Henry Clay first using the phrase in a Senate debate in 1832. Americans, countless opinion surveys have shown, believe that whether or not one succeeds in life depends overwhelmingly on one's own talents and character. In the absence of rigid social hierarchies, one is what one achieves.

From the beginning, America's religion has been the religion of work. In other societies, heredity, class, social status, ethnicity, and family are the principal sources of status and legitimacy. In America, work is. In different ways both aristocratic and socialist societies tend to demean and discourage work. Bourgeois societies promote work. America, the quintessential bourgeois society, glorifies work. When asked "What do you do?" almost no American dares answer "Nothing." As Harvard theorist Judith Shklar has pointed out, throughout

American history social standing has depended on working and earning money by working. Employment is the source of self-assurance and independence. "Be industrious and free," as Benjamin Franklin put it. This glorification of work came to the fore during the Jacksonian era, when people were classified as "do-somethings" or "do-nothings." The Frenchman Michel Chevalier, who visited America in the 1830s, commented,

The manners and customs are those of a working, busy society. A man who has no profession and—which is nearly the same thing—who is not married enjoys little consideration; he who is an active and useful member of society, who contributes his share to augment the national wealth and increase the numbers of the population, he only is looked upon with respect and favor. The American is brought up with the idea that he will have some particular occupation and that if he is active and intelligent he will make his fortune. He has no conception of living without a profession, even when his family is rich. The habits of life are those of an exclusively working people. From the moment he gets up, the American is at his work, and he is absorbed in it till the hour of sleep.

The right to labor and to the rewards of labor was part of the 19th-century arguments against slavery, and the central right espoused by the new Republican Party was the "right to labor productively, to pursue one's vocation and reap its rewards."

In the 1990s Americans remained people of work. They worked longer hours and took shorter vacations than people in other industrialized democracies. The hours of work in other industrialized societies were decreasing. In America, if anything, they were increas-

ing. Among industrialized countries the average hours a worker worked in 1997 were: America—1,966, Japan—1,889, Australia—1,867, New Zealand—1,838, Britain—1,731, France—1,656, Sweden—1,582, Germany—1,560, Norway—1,399. On average, Americans worked 350 more hours per year than Europeans. In 1999, 60 percent of American teenagers worked, three times the average of other industrialized countries.

Historically Americans have had an ambivalent attitude toward leisure, often feeling guilty about it, and attempting to reconcile it with their work ethic. As Cindy Aron argued in her book *Working at Play*, Americans in the 20th century remained prisoners of the "persistent and continuing American suspicion of time spent away from work." Americans often tend to feel they should devote their vacations not only to unproductive leisure but to good works and self-improvement.

Americans have not only worked more than other peoples, but they have found satisfaction in and identified themselves with their work more than others have. In a 1990 International Values Survey of ten countries, 87 percent of Americans reported that they took a great deal of pride in their work, with only the British reporting a comparable number. In most countries, less than 30 percent of workers expressed that view. Americans have consistently believed that hard work is the key to individual success. In the early 1990s, some 80 percent of Americans said that to be an American it is necessary to subscribe to the work ethic. Ninety percent of Americans said they would work harder if necessary for the success of their organization and 67 percent said they would not welcome social change that would lead to less emphasis on hard work.

Throughout American history, immigrants have faced the challenge of adapting to the work ethic. In 1854, the

Swiss-German Philip Schaff advised potential immigrants to America:

Prepare for all sorts of privations; trust not to fortune and circumstances, but to God and unwearied industry. If you wish a calm and cheerful life, better stay at home. The good old advice: Pray and work, is nowhere more to the point than in the United States. The genuine American despises nothing more than idleness and stagnation; he regards not enjoyment, but labor, not comfortable repose, but busy unrest, as the proper earthly lot of man; and this has unspeakable importance for him, and upon the whole a most salutary influence on the moral life of the nation.

In the 1890s Polish immigrants to America were overwhelmed by the amount of work that they were expected to perform. "In America," one wrote, "one has to sweat more during a day than during a whole week in Poland." In 1999 a Cuban-American, Alex Alvarez, warned new Cuban immigrants of what they would confront in America:

Welcome to the capitalist system. Each one of you is responsible for the amount of money you have in your pocket. The Government is not responsible for whether you eat, or whether you're poor or rich. The Government doesn't guarantee you a job or a house. You've come to a rich and powerful country, but it is up to you whether or not you continue living like you did in Cuba.

Moralism and the Reform Ethic

American politics, like the politics of other societies, has been and remains a politics of personality and faction, class and region, interest group and ethnic

group. To an extraordinary degree, however, it has also been and remains a politics of moralism and moral passion. American political values are embodied in the Creed, and efforts to realize those values in political behavior and institutions are a recurring theme in American history. Individually Americans have the responsibility to pursue the American dream and achieve what they can

IN THE 1890S POLISH IMMIGRANTS TO AMERICA WERE OVERWHELMED BY THE AMOUNT OF WORK THAT THEY WERE EXPECTED TO PERFORM.

through their talents, character, and hard work. Collectively Americans have the responsibility to insure that their society is indeed the promised land. In theory, success in the reform of the individual could remove any need for the collective reform of society, and several great evangelists opposed social and political reforms precisely because they were not directed to the regeneration of the individual soul. In practice, however, the Great Awakenings in American history have been closely related to great periods of political reform. These manifestations of "creedal passion" have been fundamentally shaped by the dissenting, evangelical nature of American Protestantism. Robert Bellah neatly summarizes its role:

Every movement to make America more fully realize its professed values has grown out of some form of public theology, from the abolitionists to the social gospel and the early socialist party to the civil rights movement under Martin Luther King and the farm workers' movement under César Chávez. But so has every expansionist war and every form of oppression of racial minorities and immigrant groups.

Historians identify four Great Awakenings in the history of American Protestantism, each of which was associated with and immediately followed by major efforts at political reform. Many political, economic, and ideational factors came together to create the American Revolution. Among the latter were Lockeian liberalism, Enlightenment rationalism, and Whig republican-

ism. Also of central importance were the Revolution's religious sources, most notably the Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740s. Led by George Whitefield and other revivalist preachers and provided with doctrine and justification by Jonathan Edwards, the Awakening swept across the colonies mobilizing thousands of Americans to commit themselves to a new birth in Christ. This religious upheaval laid the basis for the political upheaval that immediately followed. "The evangelical impulse," as the Harvard scholar Alan Heimert said, "was the avatar and instrument of a fervent American nationalism. In the evangelical churches of pre-Revolutionary America was forged that union of tribunes and people that was to characterize the early American Democracy."

Although Americans varied in the degree to which they supported or opposed it, the Awakening was the first popular movement to engage people from virtually all sects and denominations throughout the colonies. The Awakening's charismatic evangelist, Whitefield, preached from Georgia to New Hampshire and was the first truly American public figure. It thus created the experience and the environment for the transcolony political movements

that led to independence. It was the first unifying experience for Americans, generating a sense of national, distinct from provincial, consciousness. "The Revolution," John Adams observed in 1818, "was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations."

The Second Great Awakening of the 1820s and 1830s was, as Robert Bellah says, "evangelical and revivalist," in effect the "second American revolution." It was marked by the tremendous expansion of the Methodist and Baptist churches and by the formation of many new denominations. In the Second Great Awakening, the counterpart to Whitefield was Charles G. Finney, who recruited tens of thousands of people into American churches and preached the need to "work as well as believe" and as a result generated a "mighty influence toward reform." Religious revivalism gave rise to multitudinous efforts at social and political improvement. As William Sweet describes it: "Societies were formed to advance the cause of temperance; to promote Sunday Schools; to save sailors at the ports and along the canals; to fight the use of tobacco; to improve the diet; to advance the cause of peace; to reform prisons; to stop prostitution; to colonize Negroes in Africa; to support education." The most important child of the Awakening, however, was the abolitionist movement, which in the early 1830s took on new life, placed the slavery issue squarely on the national agenda, and for the next quarter century aroused and mobilized people in the cause of emancipation. When war came over that issue, soldiers from both North and South marched off to fight sure that their cause was God's cause. The depth of the religious dimension in that conflict is reflected in the immense popularity in the North of the "Battle Hymn" crafted

by Julia Ward Howe, which begins with a vision of "the glory of the coming of the Lord" and ends with the invocation of Christ: "As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free. While God is marching on."

The third Great Awakening got under way in the 1890s and was intimately linked with the populist and Progressive drives for social and political reform. The latter were suffused with Protestant morality and, as in the previous reform periods, the reformers stressed the moral necessity of eliminating the gap between institutions and ideals and creating a just and equitable society. The reformers attacked the concentrated power of corporate monopolies and big-city machines and, in varying degrees, advocated antitrust measures, women's suffrage, the initiative, referendum, and recall, prohibition, regulation of rail-

eral challenging of the institutions of established authority in the 1960s and 1970s, focused on the conduct of the Vietnam War and the abuse of power in the Nixon administration. In some cases, Protestant leaders and organizations, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, played central roles. In other instances, as with New Left organizations, the movement was entirely secular in definition but equally intense in its moralism. The New Left, as one of its leaders said in the early 1960s, "begins from moral values which are held as absolute." The second and later manifestation was the conservative drive for reform in the 1980s and 1990s focusing on the need to reduce governmental authority, social welfare programs, and taxes while at the same time attempting to expand government restrictions on abortion.

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roads, the direct primary. Support for these reforms was strongest in the Midwest and far West, the areas of "Greater New England" to which the descendants of the Puritans had migrated and where the intellectual, social, and religious legacy of the Puritans predominated.

The fourth Great Awakening originated in the 1950s and 1960s with the growth of evangelical Protestantism. It is associated with two reform movements in American politics. The first, beginning in the late 1950s, focused on the most obvious gap between American values and American reality, the legal and institutional discrimination against and segregation of America's black minority. It then led on to the gen-

Dissenting Protestantism has marked American foreign policy as well as its domestic politics. In conducting their foreign policy, most states give overwhelming priority to what are generally termed the "realist" concerns of power, security, and wealth. Americans also, however, feel the need to promote in their relations with other societies and within those societies the moralistic goals they pursue at home. In the new republic before 1815, America's Founding Fathers debated and conducted its foreign relations overwhelmingly in realist terms. They led an extremely small republic bordered by possessions of the then great powers, Britain, France, and Spain, which were for most

of these years fighting each other. In the course of fighting indecisive wars with Britain and France, intervening militarily in Spain's possessions, and doubling the size of their country by the Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon, America's leaders proved themselves adept practitioners of European-style power politics. With the end of the Napoleonic era, America was able to downgrade its realist concerns with power and security and pursue largely economic objectives in its foreign relations while concentrating its energies on the expansion and development of its own territory. In this phase, as Walter McDougall has argued, the purpose of Americans was indeed to make their country the promised land.

At the end of the 19th century, however, America emerged as a global power. This produced two conflicting developments. On the one hand, as a great power, America could not ignore the realities of power politics. To maintain its status and security it would presumably have to compete in a hard-nosed manner with the other great powers in the world. At the same time, its emergence as a great power also made it possible for America to promote abroad the moral values and principles on which it had aspired to build its society at home. The relation between realism and moralism thus became the central issue of American foreign policy in the 20th century, as Americans, in McDougall's words, redefined their country from "promised land" to "crusader state." ■

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Out of the Park

Steroid use has created a new breed of slugger and is corrupting our national pastime.

By Steve Sailer

IN THE 17TH YEAR of the world's slowest-moving scandal, baseball's steroid controversy finally picked up momentum as the *San Francisco Chronicle* revealed that federal investigators had implicated superstar sluggers Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi, and Gary Sheffield, among others, in the BALCO doping imbroglio. This followed a State of the Union address in which President George W. Bush used his bully pulpit to call for a crackdown on athletes using chemical muscle-builders, a denunciation that stood in contrast to the Bush dynasty's previous encounters with steroids.

Have you noticed that a lot of steroid cheaters, alleged and admitted, are jerks? So, do jerks take steroids? Or do steroids make jerks? Both are likely true. Good guys don't cheat. And the masculinizing side effects of steroids make many users more volatile, even violent. Baseball's brouhaha illuminates a growing challenge for society in general as the biotechnology-driven masculinity arms race (or, perhaps more precisely, biceps race) expands beyond sports. Politicians, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jesse Ventura, and even pundits, such as Andrew Sullivan, have turbocharged their careers by ingesting the manly molecule. But do we want the most aggressive men to boost their masculinity even further by artificial means? Or is the natural balance best for society as a whole?

A history of baseball's seduction by steroids can now finally be pieced together. First synthesized in central Europe in the 1930s, scientifically savvy athletes, such as Olympic shot-putters, began injecting artificial male hormones in the 1950s. Bodybuilders were close behind. For example, Austrian weightlifters who trained with the teenage Schwarzenegger told the *Los Angeles Times* that the future governor of California started using steroids in 1964 at age 17. In the 1970s and 1980s, the manly ladies of East Germany dominated the distaff side of the Olympics because their Communist regime forced steroids upon them.

This trend largely bypassed baseball, however, because ballplayers were among the last athletes (besides golfers) to try honest weightlifting. Pumping iron benefits almost all athletes, but the frustrations of reaching maximum natural strength within a few years can encourage some to then move on to steroids.

Baseball has always been, at best, proudly traditional and, at worst, lazily lackadaisical about innovation, especially if it involves hard physical or mental work. Ballplayers justified spending the off-season in the tavern rather than the gym because of the dread fear of becoming "muscle-bound."

There were exceptions. A century ago, Honus Wagner, the slugging shortstop who was probably the greatest National Leaguer before World War II,

lifted dumbbells. Similarly, after Babe Ruth's embarrassing 1925 season, most observers thought the hard-living 30-year-old was permanently washed up. Instead, Ruth hired a personal trainer and worked out in a gym for the next ten winters, in the course of which he broke his own record with 60 homers in 1927. But Wagner and Ruth's stupendous statistics didn't convince lesser players, who refused to lift anything heavier than a beer mug. Mickey Mantle's off-season exercise regimen consisted of going hunting when his hangover wasn't too blinding.

Slowly, conditioning improved. More players cut back on the booze and a few of the most intelligent, such as Tom Seaver, Nolan Ryan, and Brian Downing, started to lift weights.

Baseball's first flagrantly obvious steroid abuser didn't arrive until 1986, when the Oakland A's Jose Canseco won Rookie of the Year. Canseco started out tall and slender in the minor leagues, but eventually bulked up to 240 pounds. Most tellingly, he possessed the juicer's equivalent of the portrait of Dorian Gray: his identical twin Ozzie, who stayed spindly and in the minors for years, before eventually inflating himself too.

"Jose Canseco was the Typhoid Mary of steroids," one baseball agent told me. After Canseco joined a team, some of his new teammates would suddenly beef up. Indeed, Canseco recently told book companies to whom he was peddling his proposal for a tell-all autobiography that he had helped obtain steroids for other players.

In 1988, Canseco won the American League Most Valuable Player award by becoming the first to hit 40 homers and steal 40 bases in one season. But that made Canseco conspicuous at the wrong time. At the Seoul Olympics that September, Canadian Ben Johnson—the once skinny, shy, and slow sprinter suddenly turned burly, surly, and swift—blasted off

like a fuel-injected funny car in the 100m dash to beat Carl Lewis and set an astonishing world record. "Benoid's" urine test turned up highly positive, and his gold medal and record were stripped from him. A few days later, during the American League playoffs, Red Sox fans taunted Canseco with chants of "STERoids!" He responded by posing like a bodybuilder. *Washington Post* sports columnist Tom Boswell publicly accused Canseco of being on the juice.

Following Ben Johnson's disgrace, track became more serious about drug testing. This slowed women runners noticeably. Because women naturally produce only about one-tenth as much testosterone as men, they get more bang for the buck out of a dose of steroids. That's why Warsaw Bloc women dominated women's sprinting, but their menfolk could seldom beat sprinters of West African descent. Tougher testing combined with the collapse of the Communist sports-industrial complexes meant that female medalists ran a striking 0.6 percent slower at the cleaner 1996 Olympics than at the 1988 Festival of

years, ballplayers super-sized themselves. Home run totals, fan excitement, and revenue swelled, too.

Worried about schoolboys wishing to emulate their idols, President George H.W. Bush signed a bill making steroids a controlled substance in 1990. Yet he then sent a thoroughly mixed message by appointing movie musclemann Schwarzenegger, the world's most famous role model for steroids, as chairman of the President's Council on Physical Fitness.

The elder Bush was probably naïve, but the younger Bush surely knew Canseco's reputation when, as co-managing director of the Texas Rangers, he signed off on a blockbuster trade for the macho man in 1992. (It's important to note that Bush's partners did not allow him much other executive responsibility. Ranger general manager Tom Grieve told PBS, "George was the front man He was the spokesperson. He dealt with the media, he dealt with the fans, and it was obvious to us right from the start that that's what he was made for." Why a man whose friends didn't consider him qualified to run a ball club is qualified to run

MICKY MANTLE'S OFF-SEASON EXERCISE REGIMEN CONSISTED OF GOING HUNTING WHEN HIS HANGOVER WASN'T TOO BLINDING.

Androgens, while men's times continued their steady improvement. Runners still cheat, but can't be as brazen. Most of the absurd women's records set in the 1980s by the communists and by America's late Florence Griffith-Joyner remain untouched.

The National Football League cracked down hard enough that some dopers reportedly had to pump someone else's clean urine up catheters into their bladders. Yet, baseball resolved to remain oblivious to the obvious and didn't test at all. In the subsequent anything-goes

the country is a question for another day.)

Canseco's Ranger years are best remembered for the long fly ball that bounced off the outfielder's increasingly block-shaped head and over the fence for a home run. Canseco's abused body became injury-prone and his personality erratic. Last year, the now retired Canseco was jailed when he failed a drug test for steroids, violating the probation stemming from a nightclub brawl he had gotten into alongside his twin Ozzie (whom had eventually hulked up to Jose's size).

Other careers began following odd trajectories, too. Journeymen ballplayers would show up at spring training with a radically different shape and crush their career high in homers by almost 30.

Downsides quickly appeared. Although players drank less, they seemed to get arrested for assault more—what bodybuilders call 'roid rage. Time spent on the disabled list grew 20 percent just between 1997 and 2001, and some injuries were gruesomely unprecedented. A former teammate of Canseco's ruptured his bicep swinging at a pitch. "In all my years of watching sport, I've never seen/heard anything so awful," wrote a fan. "When his muscle ripped, it produced a sharp snap and traveled up his arm and into his shoulder like a scurrying rodent."

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In the middle of 1996, both the size and firepower of 33-year-old Ken Caminiti suddenly exploded. He had never hit more than 26 homers in a full season but smacked 28 after the All-Star break, winning the MVP award while leading the lowly San Diego Padres to the World Series. Advertisers used the

ALTHOUGH PLAYERS **DRANK LESS**, THEY SEEMED TO GET **ARRESTED FOR ASSAULT MORE**—WHAT BODYBUILDERS CALL 'ROID RAGE.

new Caminiti as an icon of masculinity, filming him glowering in black leather on his Harley. As he admitted in 2002, though, the megablasts of anabolic homer-helpers had permanently damaged his health.

Meanwhile, baseball was finally undergoing an intellectual revolution. In the 1970s, a boiler-room attendant named Bill James whiled away the hours by statistically testing baseball's oldest argument over strategy, the one between Ty Cobb's cunning, elegant style of hitting line-drive singles, and Babe Ruth's seemingly vulgar swing-for-the-fences approach. James found that what the Cobb-admiring baseball insiders didn't understand was that Ruth had a second arrow in his offensive quiver. By slamming out of the park strikes thrown down the middle, the Bambino forced pitchers to try to nibble at the edges of the plate. When they missed, he'd accept a walk. Although Cobb's career batting average of .366 was the highest ever, significantly better than Ruth's .342, Ruth's on-base percentage of .474, the less understood but more important number, substantially beat Cobb's .433.

Slowly, the amateur statistician's views on power infiltrated the big leagues, with Oakland A's general managers Sandy Alderson and Billy Beane among the first to get the message.

When George Steinbrenner's ultra-rich New York Yankees signed away the A's homers-and-walks king Jason Giambi, Beane still had his underrated little brother Jeremy. Yet, it turned out Jason and Jeremy shared more than genes; they are both implicated in the BALCO scandal.

Bonds, the greatest all-around player of the last decade, may well have been clean until recently. With pumped-up lesser talents like Mark McGwire, who was found with the legal steroid precursor Androstenedione in his locker, becoming folk heroes, Bonds apparently decided to turn himself into the monster that hit 73 home runs in 2001 with the alleged help of steroids and human growth hormone.

That's the real problem: even guys who want to play fair are under pressure from cheaters to play foul. This arms race is spreading beyond sports. As an opinion journalist, for instance, I have to compete with AndroGel Andrew Sullivan, who resurrected his career via prescription testosterone, as he explained in loving detail in the *New York Times* magazine four years ago. On his blog, the enormously energetic Sullivan asked, "Would you rather live till you're 85, gradually sinking into torpor and sexual collapse or have a great time and conk out at 65?"

That is the kind of question that the voluntary lab rats will make all of us confront in the years ahead. ■

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Send in the Marines—Again

Three occupations later, Haiti is not even a state (much less a democracy)—and is not likely to become one anytime soon.

By William S. Lind

THE MARINES HAVE LANDED and the situation is not well in hand, nor will it ever be. I am speaking, of course, of Haiti, that boil on the Western Hemisphere's posterior that no plaster can ever cure. In the 18th century, Haiti was so rich, thanks to the sugar trade, that it alone provided two-thirds of the value of France's overseas commerce. Today, Haiti is so poor that the average American dog probably lives better than the average Haitian.

Once again, American troops have been given "mission impossible": creating a state. While Haiti is an extreme case, what it represents, the disappearance of the state, is becoming more and more common. As in Somalia, much of West Africa, Afghanistan, and (thanks to an American invasion) Iraq, when the state vanishes, the vacuum it leaves is filled not by one new element but by many, of many different kinds: gangs, religions, militias, mahdis, business enterprises, mobs, wannabe mercenaries, you name it. State militaries, which are designed to fight other state militaries much like themselves, do not know what to do. First they find themselves targets of enemies they cannot distinguish from the civilian population. Then they get caught in the middle of the locals' battles with each other. And finally they leave, simply unable to cope. The chaos remains, unless and until some local tyrant arises who can impose a welcome if oppressive peace.

But I forget: just ten years ago, we solved all of Haiti's problems. Applying the neocons' prescription for the whole world, we sent in thousands of American troops, overthrew the "undemocratic" Haitian government, and installed Haiti's Mr. Chalabi, Monsieur Aristide. (One wonders where we find these people; is there a temp agency for them, Rent-a-Quisling?) We also spent around \$3 billion, which, in a memorable phrase from the *New York Times*, "has washed away like the soil on Haiti's denuded hills." Yet for some incomprehensible reason, democracy backed by American bayonets failed to turn Haiti into Switzerland. It's probably because we forgot to teach them how to make cuckoo clocks and put holes in cheese.

More, Monsieur Aristide, from the relative safety of Jamaican exile, now accuses the United States of having given him the bum's rush. The charge is probably false—men whose resumes include "ex-priest" are generally not of the highest moral character—but Aristide is clever enough to know it will resonate in a world grown doubtful of America's intentions. The Bush administration's attempt to play innocents abroad while simultaneously waging war on behalf of Brave New World is not universally applauded. In Haiti, Aristide's claim to retain the imperial purple will encourage his gangs to continue the fight—or at least the looting.

Haiti is in fact a fair test of the neocons' thesis, which we are now putting to further trials in the Middle East. Their core argument is that history and culture simply do not matter. Everyone in the world wants a New World Order of "democratic capitalism," and everyone is also capable of it. To think otherwise is to commit the sin of "historicism."

The argument is absurd on the face of it. History and culture don't matter? Not only do the failed cultures and disastrous histories of most of the world argue the contrary, so does our own history and culture. Democratic capitalism (the real variety) first developed in one place, England, over an historical course that goes back almost a thousand years, to the Magna Carta. America was born as an independent country to guarantee the rights of Englishmen. If England had possessed the culture of, say, Mongolia, can anyone with the slightest grasp on reality think we would be what we are today?

Haiti is the other side of the same coin. Haiti is the godawful pit that it is because of its history and culture. If the people on Haiti were replaced tomorrow by, for example, Swedes, can anyone even pretend to believe that it would remain the same?

The fantastical nature of Haitian culture was illustrated by an incident during our last occupation of Haiti in the 1990s. A Haitian woman ran up to an American soldier, writhing and screaming. "What

is she saying?" the soldier asked an interpreter. The interpreter replied, "She is yelling that someone has put a curse on her, and she is shrinking." The soldier, a quick-thinking lad, reached into his pack and pulled out an envelope of instant coffee. He tore the envelope open and sprinkled the contents over the woman's head, shouting out the Notre Dame fight song as he sprinkled. Through the interpreter, he then told the Haitian she was cured. She went home happy.

No one of lesser powers than the Archangel Michael's can do anything with such a place. No system—not fascism, not communism, not "democratic capitalism" a.k.a. Brave New World, not monarchy (theocracy might be the best bet)—can make Haiti work. It is as predestined as any Calvinist, predestined to the non-state life as Hobbes described it. No political theory, least of all the vapid and simplistic theory of the neocons, can alter that reality.

So what are our Marines to do? Anyone can take Haiti: Poland could take Haiti, Luxembourg could take Haiti, the New York Police Department could take Haiti. But then what? We

seem to have decided on the best bet for step two: hand the problem to somebody else, in this case the UN with (we hope) Brazil assuming command of the occupation force. Longer term, the least bad option is probably to choose one of the less brutal local thugs from what passes as the Haitian upper class and to install him as the new "Big Man." Bring back the Haitian Army, and let it reassume its traditional local monopoly on crime, which is preferable to intense criminal competition. Buy protection for humanitarian efforts to feed the starving, run a few schools and provide some jobs. Make sure the U.S. Coast Guard keeps up its patrols so everyone knows they cannot get to Miami.

But the neocons do not deal with reality. The theory that everybody wants the neoconservative version of "democratic capitalism" says nothing about practical application, but it says a great deal about its proponents. First, it tells us that they are ideologues. All ideologies posit that certain things must be true, regardless of any evidence to the contrary. That evidence is to be suppressed, along with the people who insist on pointing to it. Sadly, the neocons have

been able to do exactly that within the Bush administration, and the mess in Iraq is the price.

Second, it reveals the nature of the neocon ideology, which has nothing whatsoever to do with conservatism. As Russell Kirk wrote, conservatism is the negation of ideology. The neocons are in fact Jacobins, the vipers of the French Revolution who also tried to export human rights (which are very different from the concrete, specific rights of Englishmen) on bayonets. Then, the effort eventually united all of Europe against France. Today, it is uniting the rest of the world against America.

Finally it reveals the neocons as fools, lightweights who can dismiss history and culture because they know nothing of history or culture. The first generation of neocons were serious intellectuals—Trotskyites, but serious Trotskyites. The generation now in power in Washington is made up of *poseurs* who happen to have the infighting skills of the Sopranos. Perhaps it was America's turn to have its foreign policy captured by a gang of ignorant and reckless adventurers. It has happened to others: Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in the 1930s.

Reality was best summed up by a Haitian shopkeeper, Regine Santil, who was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying, "We have proved through the years that we are incapable of running this country. But didn't the Americans who brought Aristide back 10 years ago know that this day would come?" As it will in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and anywhere else American troops are sent by the neocons' march of folly. ■

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Abusing the Holocaust

The overused analogy misdirects American policy.

By Michael C. Desch

THE HOLOCAUST has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Discussions of U.S.-Israeli relations and debates about humanitarian intervention are invariably couched in the rhetoric of the Holocaust. According to *Washington Post* columnist Richard Cohen, the Holocaust analogy is now so widely accepted that it has become today's equivalent of the "Munich analogy." The most recent example of this is Richard Perle and David Frum's claim in their new book that we face either "victory or holocaust" in the War on Terror.

Among most Americans, the received wisdom about the Holocaust is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered six million of them. In effect, the Jews were callously abandoned in their moment of peril although there was ample opportunity before and during the war to save them. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must "never again" watch passively as large numbers of people are slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion.

The rhetoric of recent presidents shows how accepted the Holocaust analogy is in American political life. "Out of our memory of the Holocaust,"

Jimmy Carter enjoined, "we must forge an unshakable oath with all civilized people that never again will the world stand silent, never again will the world fail to act in time to prevent this terrible crime of genocide." At the groundbreaking for the U.S. Holocaust Museum, George H.W. Bush admonished the audience, "Here we will learn that each of us bears responsibility for our actions and for our failure to act. Here we will learn that we must intervene when we see evil arise." Finally, at the inauguration of the Holocaust Museum, Bill Clinton concurred: "For those of us here today representing the nations of the West, we must live forever with this knowledge: Even as our fragmentary awareness of crimes grew into indisputable facts, far too little was done."

The deeply held belief that the United States should never again behave like it did in response to the Holocaust has two concrete policy implications. To begin with, policymakers invariably insist that the United States should unequivocally support the state of Israel. Richard Nixon, who was no philo-Semite, admitted in 1994, "No American President will let Israel go down the tubes [because] Israel is a haven for millions whose families endured incredible suffering during the Holocaust." "The Holocaust underlined, in the starkest terms, the moral basis for Israel's founding," Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) recently wrote in *Reader's*

Digest. "In standing by Israel, we are merely being true to ourselves. If we ever turned our backs on Israel, we would be abandoning the principles that built our nation."

Moreover, it is an article of faith among American elites that the United States has a moral responsibility to stop virtually any mass killing, especially genocides. For example, Congressman Steve Solarz (D-NY) and Brookings Institution analyst Michael O'Hanlon write, "We cannot bring back to life the victims of the Holocaust and the other genocides that have been among the cardinal characteristics of the century in which we live. But if we can resolve to prevent future genocides and mass killings when possible, the sacrifices and sufferings of those who lost their lives in the gas chambers of Nazi-occupied Europe and the killing fields of Cambodia and Rwanda will not have been entirely in vain." In a recent *Washington Post* interview the architect of the Bush administration's war on Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, cited the international community's failure to act in the face of Nazi extermination of the Jews as a compelling reason why the United States had to depose Saddam Hussein. This rationale has become even more important now, one suspects, as it appears that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction or meaningful links to al-Qaeda.

There is no question that historical analogies are frequently used by policymakers to deal with contemporary issues. Sometimes they provide useful guidance; other times they serve merely as a rationalization to mobilize support for policies that would otherwise be hard to sell to the public. Unfortunately, the lessons of the past are often misunderstood and misapplied, resulting in faulty policy outcomes. In the 1960s, for example, the ubiquitous Munich analogy—that the Allies’ failure to stand up

States and abroad. Thus, historian Peter Novick, a critic of this view, nevertheless concludes, “No lesson of the Holocaust is pressed more often and more forcefully than ‘the crime of indifference.’”

The West’s indifference, it is argued, manifested itself in six failures. First, due largely to anti-Semitism, the United States, Britain, and many other countries imposed such tight immigration quotas that few Jews were able to escape Nazi Germany before the war began. The second failure of the interna-

of innocent Jews but were also animated not by ignorance or legitimate strategic concerns but rather by baser motives such as anti-Semitism. These failures thus represent a significant moral lapse on the part of the international community. In the words of Arthur Koestler: “As long as you don’t feel ... ashamed of being alive while others are being put to death, you will remain what you are, an accomplice by omission.” The moral lesson of the Holocaust, which makes the analogy particularly powerful in contemporary policy debates, is that those who stand by and do nothing are silent accomplices to genocide. Never again, many Americans are convinced, should the United States stand idly by while innocents are killed merely because of their religion, race, or ethnicity.

However, the Holocaust analogy and its never-again obligation are based on a misreading of what the United States and the rest of the international community did and could have done to save Europe’s Jews before and during the Second World War. The work of leading scholars such as Raul Hilberg, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Tom Segev, Benny Morris, and Peter Novick provides reasons to question various aspects of this conventional wisdom. After an exhaustive assessment of the literature on the Holocaust, historian William Rubinstein concludes in his book *The Myth of Rescue*, “No Jew who perished during the Nazi Holocaust could have been saved by any action which the Allies could have taken at the time, given what was actually known about the Holocaust, what was actually proposed at the time and what was realistically possible.” This is a sweeping conclusion and one that no doubt could be challenged in some of its particulars. But on balance, there is enough truth in it to undermine the Holocaust analogy and call into question the obligation that many contemporary

THE MORAL LESSON IS THAT THOSE WHO STAND BY AND DO NOTHING ARE SILENT ACCOMPLICES TO GENOCIDE.

to Hitler over Czechoslovakia in 1938 caused the Second World War—helped steer the United States into the disastrous Vietnam War. Hence, we should be wary of historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure that they are based on sound history and are used wisely by policymakers.

In my view, the widely accepted Holocaust analogy is based on a misreading of history and its “never again” obligations have not always served U.S. interests. It is premised on the historical claim that the international community—particularly democracies like the United States and Great Britain and moral leaders like the Pope—knowingly stood by while millions of Jews were systematically persecuted and then murdered by the Third Reich and its allies. “The Nazis were the murderers, but we were all too passive accomplices,” argues historian David Wyman, who maintains that a “substantial commitment to rescue could have saved several hundred thousand [Jews] and done so without compromising the war effort.” This interpretation of what happened is widely accepted among politicians and pundits in the United

tional community was that once the war began, plans to rescue the beleaguered Jews of occupied Europe were not vigorously pursued. The international community’s third failure, according to this school of thought, was its unwillingness to use the Allies’ substantial military capability to destroy the infrastructure of the Holocaust through bombing the transportation, killing, and incineration facilities of the Nazi death-camp system. The fourth failure was the tardiness of the United States in establishing the War Refugee Board to coordinate efforts to save embattled Jews throughout Europe during the war. The international community’s fifth alleged failure was its unwillingness to pursue opportunities to negotiate with the Nazis or their allies for the release of Jews during the war. The final, and for some most ethically reprehensible, failure was the silence of many moral leaders around the world who supposedly knew about, but did not publicly condemn, the Holocaust.

Critics argue that these failures not only resulted in the needless deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions,

policymakers and pundits feel to support the state of Israel unreservedly and intervene indiscriminately in humanitarian crises around the world.

Upon closer consideration, each of the six “failures” that Wyman and others offer as evidence that the international community was complicit in the Holocaust through indifference, turn out to be far less clear cut.

To begin with, it is true that the United States and many other allied countries had immigration quotas before the war that were the result in part of discreditable motives. But much of the contemporary moral outrage about America’s inter-war immigration policies is based on the assumption that American officials knew in the 1930s what we know now: that German persecution of the Jews would end in the Holocaust. Using 20/20 hindsight, it is easy to see a straight line running from the Nuremberg Laws through Kristallnacht to Auschwitz. But at the time, few imagined what Hitler had in store for Europe’s Jews. Moreover, we tend to forget that America’s immigration quotas were not explicitly designed to keep out German Jews but rather were directed at Eastern and Southern Europeans and Asians. Indeed, Germany had one of the largest quotas during the 1930s, and most applicants for immigration visas in Germany were Jews.

It is also important to keep in mind that, despite these quotas, over 160,000 Jews came to the United States during the 1930s, more than to any other country in the world. In the critical period after Kristallnacht in 1938 through the beginning of the war in the West in 1940, Jews constituted over half of all immigrants to the United States. This calls into question how much of a role anti-Semitism, which was admittedly widespread in American society and the U.S. government, really played in U.S. immigration policy.

Moreover, as Rubinstein notes, 72 percent of German Jews did manage to get out of Germany prior to September 1, 1939. The problem is that most of them, thinking that the troubles in Germany would soon blow over, did not go much further than the countries bordering Germany, as John V.H. Dippel chronicles in his book *Bound Upon a Wheel of Fire: Why So Many Jews Made the Tragic Decision to Remain in Nazi Germany*. Unfortunately, these countries were rapidly occupied by the Third Reich in the early stages of the war, and Jews there had little chance to escape.

At least five factors account for the lack of urgency among large numbers of European Jews about fleeing Europe. First, among many European Jews, Russia, rather than Germany, was historically regarded as the seat of violent anti-Semitism, and it was hard for them to recognize their peril in the Third Reich until quite late. Second, given the economic crisis of the 1930s, few Jews regarded the United States as the land of opportunity, and they were loath to give up their established positions in Europe to start from scratch in the New World. Third, for the Jews of Soviet-occupied

tine—was only a fringe movement among European Jews before World War II, and few Jews were eager to go to Palestine before the war began. British quotas on Jewish immigrants to Palestine thus probably were not a major factor in the reluctance of European Jews to go there, a fact widely acknowledged by the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine. In short, the inter-war immigration quotas, while morally reprehensible, did not play as large a role in preventing European Jews from escaping Germany before the Second World War as critics charge. Of course, if even a handful of Jews died because of overly restrictive immigration quotas, that represents a serious moral failing. However, the only obligation that imposes on the United States is that it be more lenient in its refugee policy in the future.

Nor is it fair to argue that the international community failed because it did not actively make plans to rescue the Jews once it became obvious what Hitler had in store for them. While there is some debate about when the Nazis began to plan for a Final Solution to the Jewish question, the best evidence sug-

OVER 160,000 JEWS CAME TO THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 1930S, MORE THAN TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD.

territory, Communist censorship, in line with the Nazi-Soviet alliance, hid evidence of what was happening in Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe until it was too late to relocate. Fourth, many Jews believed that their ancestors had survived anti-Semitism in the past by co-operation and subservience rather than resistance or flight, and this tradition made them hesitant to leave Nazi Germany. Finally, Zionism—the belief that the Jews needed a homeland in Pales-

gests that they did not decide on extermination until late 1941. Credible reports of the Nazis’ mass murder of the Jews reached the West only in late 1942, well after the war had begun. In other words, it was not clear until the middle of the war what was happening to the Jews of Europe. Moreover, none of the critics have been able to point to a rescue plan that had any chance of success short of the Allies winning the war. Thus, the international community can

hardly be faulted for not launching a rescue effort before its members knew for certain one was necessary and if none was then possible.

No other Allied failure is more often criticized than the decision not to try to halt the killing by bombing death camps like Auschwitz. For many, this is the strongest indictment of Allied wartime behavior. Bombing Auschwitz was discussed during the war within the American government, but it was ultimately rejected in favor of concentrating on winning the war. While it is arguable how many Allied resources would have been diverted from the war effort by air strikes on Auschwitz and other killing centers, it seems clear that bombing would have done little to halt the Final Solution.

It is important to recall that since 80 percent of Jews who would die in the Holocaust had already been killed by spring 1944 when the Allies finally had air bases close enough to regularly strike targets in Central Europe, even the most optimistic proponents of bombing the death camps count the lives it could have saved in the hundreds of thousands, not millions—certainly a consequential number, but a small percentage of the total loss.

Their main contention is that doing so could have saved some of Hungary's 740,000 Jews who had survived to that point. Even this more limited goal would have been hopeless, however. The transportation of the Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz and their subsequent murder took place very quickly between May 15 and July 9, 1944, so the window for Allied action was very small. Since there were redundant rail links between Budapest and Auschwitz, and the Germans had become quite adept at repairing bomb-damaged track during earlier bombing campaigns, the Allies could not have slowed the killing much by disrupting the Nazis' transportation

system. Bombing the gas chambers and crematoria within Auschwitz itself was not a solution either. Despite having general intelligence about the activities of the camp by the summer of 1944, the Allies lacked specific intelligence about exactly which buildings were integral parts of the killing machine. Even if the Allies had that specific information, U.S. heavy bombers (B-24s) did not have the accuracy to destroy small targets like the gas chambers and crematoria without also hitting the surrounding barracks where most of the inmates were housed. The more accurate medium (B-25) and light (P-38) bombers did not have sufficient range to hit targets in Central Europe.

Finally, even if the Allies had been able totally to disrupt the railroads and destroy the killing apparatus in the camps, it probably would have done little to save the Hungarian Jews, inasmuch as the Nazis could have just shot

myth that the WRB saved these Jews. In fact, the survival of nearly 300,000 Jews in Old Romania had more to do with the changing fortunes of war and Romanian nationalism than the activities of the WRB. The Board also played a minimal role in the survival of 150,000 Jews in Hungary, which was mostly the result of Admiral Miklós Horthy's efforts to pursue a separate peace with the Allies. In sum, criticism of the Allies for not establishing this body earlier can only be made by overstating the Board's real effectiveness in saving those European Jews who survived.

Similarly, there is little reason to think that the Allies ever passed up any real chances for negotiating with the Nazis for the release of large numbers of Jews at any point once the war began. After all, Hitler was determined to exterminate the Jews of Europe. He went to enormous lengths to achieve that end, even when it worked at cross-purposes

THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO THINK THAT THE ALLIES EVER PASSED UP ANY REAL CHANCES FOR NEGOTIATING WITH THE NAZIS FOR THE RELEASE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF JEWS AT ANY POINT ONCE THE WAR BEGAN.

them in Hungary, as they did with over a million Jews in Poland and the Soviet Union early in the war. Keep in mind the gruesome fact that the Nazis killed 33,000 Jews in open-air shootings in a matter of a few days at Babi Yar in September 1941.

Critics argue that during its short existence in the last years of the war, the U.S. War Refugee Board (WRB) saved nearly 450,000 Jews from Romania and Hungary. Given that belief, it is understandable that they would condemn Allied leaders for not establishing something like it earlier. But it is simply a

with the rest of the war effort. Why would he have agreed to let any Jews go given this fanaticism? Indeed, there is no evidence that he would have countenanced any deal to trade Jews for trucks or anything else. Hence, criticizing the Allies for not pursuing some of these supposed opportunities is unreasonable.

Finally, critics like John Cornwell and Daniel Goldhagen think that Pius XII and other Roman Catholic leaders could have spoken out against the systematic killing of Europe's Jews but did not because of anti-Semitism. But it is not

true that the Holy See never spoke out: Pius XI's encyclical *Mit Brennender Sorge* was a clear and powerful, if ultimately ineffectual, pre-war attack on National Socialism's racist agenda. His successor, Pius XII, the target of much postwar criticism for his alleged indifference, actually dabbled in an abortive German military coup plot early in the war at great risk to himself and the Church. He later authorized the sheltering of Italian Jews in Church buildings. Critics provide scant evidence that Pius XII was motivated by anti-Semitism in his conduct during the war. The obliqueness of his public condemnations of Nazi atrocities was due to the fact that he was by training a diplomat, and like any diplomat from a weak country he was cautious about he said. As Josef Stalin aptly asked: "The Pope! How many divisions has he got?"

More overt opposition to the Final Solution would not have been costless for the Holy See, and those efforts that the Church made to flex its moral muscles were largely ineffective. Critics ignore the fact that in addition to 6 million Jews, the Nazis exterminated 3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war, 3 million Polish civilians, and at least 10 million Russian non-combatants, not to mention scores of others. Thus, Hitler had no compunction about killing gentiles, including large numbers of Polish Catholic clergy and laity; Pius XII could not have spoken out without risk to millions of Catholics in Europe. The evidence from the Netherlands, where the local Catholic clergy spoke out against the deportation of the Jews and the Nazis retaliated by deporting Jewish converts to Catholicism, suggests that the Church's intercession would not have saved Jews either.

The sad truth is that there was little the Allies could have done to stop the Holocaust, short of winning the war. "Nothing can be done to save these help-

less unfortunates," Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle concluded, "except through invasion of Europe, the defeat of the German arms and the breaking of German power." This fact was widely recognized by Jewish leaders at the time as well. Rabbi Stephen Wise, a leading figure in the American Jewish community in the 1930s and 1940s, acknowledged, "The salvation of our people and all peoples who would be free can only come under God through a victory speedy and complete of the United Nations." Since the Allies focused on winning the war, and the United States in particular chose to win in Europe first, there is little reason for Americans today to feel guilty about the Holocaust. Nazi Germany and her allies alone bear full responsibility for the Holocaust and for the murder of millions of other innocent victims.

Given the fact that the Holocaust analogy is based on faulty history, it is not surprising that the policy implications drawn from it are also frequently wrong-headed. For example, our commitment to the state of Israel, based in part on redeeming our perceived indifference to the Holocaust, has hurt our standing with the Arab and Muslim states of the world. During the Eisenhower administration, the United States was viewed as an honest broker in Middle East. Today that is no longer the case, and this has complicated, and at times even undermined, U.S. policies in the region. It has also put the United States in the morally precarious position of righting a significant historical wrong against the Jews by abetting a lesser one against the Palestinians. The international community was willing to make this trade-off for Israel within its pre-1967 borders, but because of the Holocaust analogy the United States has increasingly found itself committed to support Israel outside of the borders of the UN mandate, further

undermining its position in the Middle East and elsewhere. President Gerald Ford nicely summarized the United States' dilemma:

For the past twenty-five years, the philosophical underpinning of U.S. policy toward Israel had been our conviction—and certainly my own—that if we gave Israel an ample supply of economic aid and weapons, she would feel strong and confident, more flexible and more willing to discuss a lasting peace. Every American President since Harry Truman had willingly supplied arms and funds to the Jewish state. The Israelis were stronger militarily than all their Arab neighbors combined, yet peace was no closer than it had ever been. So I began to question the rationale for our policy.... I made it clear that there was 'a substantial relationship at the present time between our national security interests and those of Israel.' Then I added, pointedly: 'But in the final analysis, we have to judge what is in our national interest above any and all other considerations.'

It has proven difficult, however, for the United States to think clearly about its national interests in the Middle East since its policies toward Israel are animated in part by historical guilt and moral obligation.

If the U.S. commitment to the state of Israel has complicated American foreign policy, it has also muddied U.S. domestic politics. The belief that we must atone for our inaction during the Holocaust makes the U.S. commitment to the state of Israel so sensitive that there is a tendency to question the motives of anyone critical of the Jewish state and its policies. President Truman recounted the bitter partisan battles over the establishment of the state of Israel:

I do not think that I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance [the partition of Palestine U.N. vote]. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—accentuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me.

“What bothered me most,” recalled former president Ford, “was the claim by some of those leaders [of the American Jewish community] that inasmuch as I was suggesting the possibility of a reassessment of our policy toward Israel, I must be anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.” Many in the current Bush administration reportedly have concluded that George H.W. Bush’s defeat in 1992 was the result of Jewish-American opposition galvanized by his hard line against Israeli settlements under the Shamir government. American support for the Jewish state has become an issue in many national elections in the United States, and almost all American politicians are sensitive to how their stance on Israel affects their electoral prospects.

Despite their overwhelming embrace, the Holocaust analogy and its never-again lessons have not necessarily been good for members of the American Jewish community either. Novick makes a compelling argument that it is a mistake for Jews to make the Holocaust central to modern Jewish-American identity. It perpetuates a victim mentality, detracts from the many positive aspects of the Jewish experience in the 20th century, and stifles debate about issues important to Jews such as Israeli foreign and domestic policies. Of course, there is no reason for American Jews to forget the Holocaust. But as Leon Wieseltier recently noted in the *New Republic*, “Hitler is Dead,” and therefore

not all of the problems facing Jews around the world can be usefully framed in terms of the Holocaust.

To be sure, not all American Jews have embraced the position of unqualified support for Israeli policies, but they remain in the minority. Some, such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who were perceived to have taken anti-Israeli stances, have been attacked *ad hominem*. The vitriol heaped upon New York University historian Tony Judt in response to his recent article in the *New York Review of Books* advocating a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is further evidence of what happens to members of the tribe who leave the reservation.

The Holocaust analogy has also distorted U.S. foreign policy in other areas of the world. For example, the obligations it imposed played a part in leading the United States to intervene twice in the Balkans. It is not clear, however, that these interventions have produced stable outcomes in either Bosnia or Kosovo. Tragically, in Bosnia the international community’s never-again rhetoric led Muslims to believe they would be protected in safe areas like Srebrenica. Unfortunately this may have lulled about 7,000 Muslim men and boys into a false sense of security and discouraged them from getting out of harm’s way before it was too late. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was also motivated and justified with frequent references to never allowing another Holocaust. Some analysts now believe that this well-intentioned intervention may in fact have accelerated, rather than halted, ethnic cleansing. As *Washington Post* columnist Richard Cohen argues: “If the United States and the West are going to intervene, the decision has to be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation and what is best for the [victims]—not a pathetically tardy response to Nazism.”

Finally, frequent invocation of the Holocaust analogy and the never-again obligation raises expectations that the United States can and will intervene any time large numbers of people are killed. When it does not, this breeds cynicism about the United States’s commitment to the protection of human rights. For example, that the United States and the rest of the international community did not intervene in Rwanda, where nearly 800,000 people were killed in genocidal violence, while we did in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the loss of life was much less (250,000 and 10,000 respectively), led many to suspect that the key difference was the color of the victims’ skin. But racism does not explain why America intervened in the Balkans but not in Rwanda. The United States did intervene in Africa to stop a major humanitarian crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s with disastrous consequences. This, not racism, made us wary of intervening in Rwanda. Also, the United States and its NATO allies had military forces and bases close to the former Yugoslavia, which made intervention there feasible. Rwanda, in contrast, was far away from NATO forces and bases, and so intervention would have been much more difficult. However, such pragmatic considerations do not carry much weight with many people today who have embraced the Holocaust analogy’s lessons and assume that failure to act must be due to indifference or worse.

Do not misunderstand: I believe that we should study the Holocaust and seek to learn lessons from it to guide contemporary policy. But the widely embraced Holocaust analogy is based on faulty history and the moral obligations derived from it have not always advanced American interests.

Europe’s Jews were not abandoned to Hitler’s tender mercies. The claim that pre-war immigration quotas were the main reason Jews did not escape Nazi

Germany is overdrawn. In fact, more than 70 percent of Germany's Jews managed to escape the Third Reich before World War II began. Unfortunately, most European Jews did not leave the continent before the war broke out, either because they did not live under Nazi rule or because they thought that the troubles in Germany would soon pass. Once the war began and the Final Solution was implemented in the latter half of 1941, the United States and its allies did not sit idly by while nearly six million Jews perished. The only way to stop the Holocaust was for the United States and its allies to win the war, which is exactly what they did. Given those facts, there is little reason for Americans to feel a sense of guilt about the Holocaust.

Furthermore, the Holocaust analogy has not contributed to sound American foreign policy. While there are good reasons why the United States should help Israel defend itself within its UN-mandated borders, the Holocaust analogy's demand for unquestioning American support for all the policies of the Jewish state undermines U.S. national interests in the Middle East. The United States also has an obligation to do what it can to prevent or mitigate grave humanitarian crises. However, it should act not out of a sense of guilt about the past, but rather from common human decency tempered by a sober assessment of what can reasonably be accomplished in each case and what best serves America's national interest. ■

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In recent meetings in Washington, Ariel Sharon's Chief of Staff Dov Weisglass told Colin Powell that the Israelis are worried

that their proposed withdrawal from Gaza will produce serious civil unrest and a takeover by the Islamic extremist group Hamas. Weisglass's impromptu comments contradicted Israeli public assertions and came as a surprise to the Bush administration. In light of the revelation, Powell urged the Israelis to postpone the withdrawal until after November. As there is significant risk of civil violence inside Gaza spilling out into Israel itself, the Bush administration is concerned lest Gaza in chaos give the impression that there has been a policy failure. Chaos does not play well at election time. Sharon will likely agree to postpone his pullout but will demand in return American acquiescence to his planned unilateral annexation of more Arab land on the West Bank and around Jerusalem. Palestinians' complaints that Sharon intended from the start to draw new borders at their expense appear to be vindicated.



In Europe, the danger posed by uncontrolled immigration has borne fruit.

The door has been opened wide and for too long, with millions of legal and illegal unassimilated workers from North Africa and the Middle East living precariously in both Eastern and Western Europe. Many are second generation, now citizens of countries that they do not respect and whose governments they would gladly overthrow. Some security experts believe that the recent terror bombing in Spain that killed 200 should serve as a warning of European vulnerability to attacks planned and executed by well established terror networks sheltering in the vast subculture of European Muslims. Al-Qaeda has condemned the "coalition of the willing" that supported the U.S. in Iraq and may intend to punish each of the countries involved. Some intelligence analysts believe that a series of devastating terrorist attacks in Europe might plausibly be expected.



The bombing in Madrid is having an immediate impact on the Athens Olympic Games.

Greece's new conservative Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis has stated that his country's reputation rides on successful completion of the Games, but the task before him may be Sisyphean. Many Olympic sites and infrastructure projects are unfinished, while tabletop exercises run to test the enormous security effort have been plagued by poor communication and bad decision-making. The unprecedented, overly muscular involvement of seven foreign countries' representatives and security agencies in the planning has also been a case of "too many cooks ...". Four hundred U.S. government "experts" are in Athens providing assistance. For the first time, foreign soldiers, in this case American and British, are participating in Olympic security training exercises. NATO will provide additional resources to detect incoming nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—another first. But some observers warn that all the planning and resources in the world might not stop a major incident. Many Greeks, brought up on a steady diet of anti-Western propaganda, identify strongly with resistance groups and terrorists. Just one terrorist sympathizer embedded within the security network could produce devastating results. ■

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Open Borders, Closed Wallets

A Republican fundraiser learns firsthand that the GOP grassroots resent the president's amnesty proposal.

By Phil Kent

THE TELEPHONE RANG and an old wealthy conservative friend answered. After the usual pleasantries, I told him I was a co-host for the upcoming Jan. 15 Bush-Cheney event at Atlanta's World Congress Center and pitched him for \$2,000 to attend and see the president on a rope-line. For \$20,000, I explained, he could have a personal audience and photograph with the commander-in-chief. Before I could even finish my last sentence, though, I was cut off. "You should know I wouldn't be writing a check after his crazy amnesty proposal."

I was not surprised, replied that I was as disgusted as he was, and pressed on with my next call. Same response—but angrier. "Why are you even helping Bush?" was the question from the third conservative donor on my list. The fourth rejection was emphatic—"I'm not giving him a dime because of that immigration announcement." The fifth person got right to the point: the president "is pandering to the open borders crowd." No check. My sixth target, who said he was "maxed out" to the campaign, was the only one to "support" the president: "Bush has given up on immigration, but I'm not concerned. Let's deal with the Democrats on other issues."

There was more of the same on my second day dialing for dollars, so I gave up. Then I warned the Georgia Bush-Cheney chairman, Jamie Reynolds, that I was failing to receive checks because of the president's stand on illegal immigration. His response was a polite

admission that he had heard rumblings too but that we all should press on.

The problem, of course, was that earlier that week—on Jan. 6, 2004—President George W. Bush proposed that Congress "adjust the legal status" of the 10 to 12 million illegal immigrants in our country. He insisted his proposal was not amnesty. Yet it most certainly is. It is also a blatant undermining of the rule of law, a threat to homeland security, a death blow to Social Security, and a below-the-belt punch to American workers.

Goaded for months by adviser Karl Rove, Bush proposed that an illegal immigrant could apply for temporary worker status for up to six years, getting all the benefits of citizenship ranging from a driver's license to Social Security checks. To facilitate this, the president asked Congress to raise the number of legal green cards to immigrants each year (currently 140,000)—yet never specified how many millions would be needed. As one of the Georgia Bush-Cheney fundraisers whispered to me at the World Congress Center: "It's all pretty dumb, isn't it?"

Even more incredibly, Bush said these temporary workers could apply for citizenship "in the normal way." Well, then, they wouldn't be temporary, would they? Furthermore, Bush's plan would allow these so-called temporary workers to bring their entire families with them for the duration of their work permits, no doubt producing American anchor babies in the process.

The fundraising reaction in my home state of Georgia was swift, as my usually reliable donors let me know. But more was to come.

On Jan. 31, at a packed Georgia Christian Coalition event in Atlanta's Mount Vernon Baptist Church, all of the candidates vying for the state's 6th Congressional district seat—perhaps the most Republican enclave in the country—blasted the amnesty plan. In addition, all of the GOP U.S. Senate primary candidates took the president to task for his remarks—to loud applause. But the most sustained applause was reserved for Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.), the head of the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus who blistered Bush and urged attendees to put "country over party" when it came to fighting illegal immigration. Congressman Tancredo underscored that Bush placed no effective limit on "temporary workers" admitted at any time. The Bush proposal allows all businesses to post any job in the country on an Internet website (presumably at any wage and working condition), and if an American does not take the job in some vague short timespan, then the business can import a foreign worker. Employers will naturally be hiring more foreigners—and the Bush proposal makes no mention of what this will do to salaries. In fact, the *Washington Times* quotes a White House official as saying that the fact that a job is open will be assumed to mean that the marketplace has determined the need for

immigration. So the impact of more Third World immigration on joblessness and wages will be tremendous—a fact that the 2004 Democrat presidential nominee, if he is smart, could underscore repeatedly.

On Feb. 5, my friend and fellow activist D.A. King organized a demonstration at the Georgia Capitol building steps to protest the Bush amnesty plan in particular and unchecked illegal immigration in general. In attendance, and supporting the cause, were the Republican leaders of the immigration caucuses in both legislative houses—Rep. Chip Lake and Sen. Casey Cagle. (My favorite sign held by a demonstrator at the rally—attended mainly by dozens of conservatives and blue-collar workers—was “Deport Karl Rove.”)

Later that day, after a speech I gave to a 250-strong senior-citizens group in Roswell, Ga., the question period focused on how the Bush proposal stabbed at the very heart of the Social Security system. Under the Social Security Act, illegal aliens are eligible for benefits if the U.S. and the home country of the illegal have a “totalization” agreement. If Congress ever agrees with the president and grants it, one questioner asked me, “What’s the end result?” I responded by quoting journalist Joel Mowbray, who said in light of the number of Mexicans potentially eligible for benefits under the Bush agreement, the total expenditure for U.S. taxpayers would far surpass \$1 billion annually. But whatever the estimate, if untold millions of illegal Mexicans, Middle Easterners, and others are allowed to collect full Social Security wages for themselves and their families—without having to work the required number of years that law-abiding citizens work to be eligible—the system could go belly-up fast.

I also attended many Georgia Republican Party county caucuses in February and March where members openly

blasted the president on immigration. A typical resolution, passed unanimously by the Rockdale County GOP, read: “Be it further resolved the ... party supports legislation and efforts to stem the negative tide of illegal immigration into the U.S. Illegal immigration challenges the very sovereignty and lifestyle of all Americans who are legal citizens” County chairman Kellie Pharr told me, “This is in direct response to our own president.”

The bottom line: the Bush amnesty and so-called “temporary worker” scheme will not pass Congress if a majority realizes that it is fiscally irresponsible, encourages massive illegal immigration, and would further balkanize society by fostering an underclass that does not want to learn English or participate in

mainstream American culture. Sen. Saxby Chambliss, (R-Ga.), sensing that Bush made a strategic error with conservatives, is now quoted by the *New York Times* as saying that Congress would make headway this session “in other proposals” guiding the hiring of foreign workers. The senator tells me Bush needs “better advice” on this issue—the understatement of the year.

Bush will carry Georgia in November, and probably the entire old Confederacy. But his main Southern conservative base, like a parent ticked off at a wayward son, is clearly not happy. ■

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Free Martha!

A conviction without a crime

By Paul Craig Roberts

THE KAFKAESQUE INDICTMENT, trial, and conviction of Martha Stewart is a devastating blow both to the U.S. legal system and to belief in the American socio-economic system. As Lawrence Stratton and I have demonstrated in our book, *The Tyranny of Good Intentions*, very little remains of the legal protections that once defined the Anglo-American legal system. Today hapless defendants are convicted not only in the absence of criminal intent but also in the absence of statutory felonies.

Martha Stewart was indicted for lying and obstructing justice. For these offenses to have any meaning, there

must be a crime that she lied about and obstructed. The prosecutors presented no such crime. Stewart was indicted and convicted for lying and obstructing a crime when no crime happened.

Many Americans believe that Stewart committed “insider trading,” because that is the disinformation her prosecutors used their media pimps to disseminate. The prosecutors would have liked to charge Stewart with insider trading, but could not. Stewart learned from her broker, not from a company insider, that a top executive was selling shares.

Since time immemorial, many people have sold shares for the same reason.

Brokers call and report that a stock is being sold when the overall market is not. That is an indication that there is bad news in the market about that stock. It is a broker's job to advise when to hold and when to fold.

Whenever a company announces good or bad news, SEC regulators and prosecutors look to see who sold or bought stock in the period immediately preceding the news. If they find company executives, or anyone whom they can connect to company executives, buying or selling prior to news, they bring a case of insider trading.

Insider trading is a creation of regulatory bureaucrats, not of statutory law. It is an undefined crime. Bureaucrats have refused to define the crime on the grounds that it is easier to convict people of undefined crimes. Many legal scholars maintain that there is no rational reason for making insider trading into an offense. Prosecutors knew that Stewart was friends with ImClone's president and jumped to the conclusion that she was tipped off by him. When it became clear that Stewart had the information from her broker, the prosecutors were reluctant to let go of their celebrity target whose demise would boost their careers. The prosecutors decided to make a crime out of a non-crime.

Stewart recognized that they were after her with an undefined crime. Like most people in such a situation, Stewart gave them a story that they would have a hard time twisting into insider trading. This is the basis for her indictment for lying and obstructing justice.

The Stewart case reminds me of the Ben Lacy case during the 1990s. Lacy was an apple-juice producer who made a few mistakes filling out environmental

forms over the course of several years. Federal prosecutors chose to interpret the few mistakes as comprising a conspiracy to hide the pollution of a stream behind his plant. As the stream tested pristine, the prosecutors did not accuse him of polluting the stream.

If they had accused him of polluting, evidence of the lack of pollution would have collapsed their case. By accusing him of conspiracy, they were able to

jurors have the impression that Stewart is part of the corporate fraud that is believed to have caused widespread losses to shareholders who are "little people." By failing to recognize the political persecution in front of their noses, the Stewart jury demonstrated the extreme risks of a jury trial. The prosecutors only wanted a symbolic scalp and had offered Stewart a plea bargain deal—a probation sentence in exchange for a plea that she made a false statement. Stewart, who has naïvely declared her belief in the integrity of the justice system, went to trial instead.

Stewart's conviction has made it even less likely that an innocent defendant will place trust in a jury. Already 95 percent of felony cases are settled with a coerced plea bargain because judges and juries routinely fail in their function of protecting defendants from prosecutorial abuse. Time after time, innocent defendants are convicted on fabricated evidence while exculpatory evidence is withheld. Based on the new DNA evidence, a large per-

centage of convicted murderers and rapists has been found innocent.

Stewart's conviction is a defeat for justice and the American way. Prosecutors have undermined the socio-economic system by sending the Marxist message that Americans become successful and rich by evading the rules and engaging in criminal behavior. ■

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keep out of court evidence that the stream was not polluted. Eventually the prosecutors had to let go of Ben Lacy, but only after they had ruined him financially.

The Martha Stewart jurors should have realized that the case was bogus when the judge threw out the main charge—that she had committed fraud by declaring her innocence. A prosecutor who would bring such a ridiculous charge obviously had no case whatsoever.

It appears the jury convicted Stewart largely on the basis that she was white and successful. In their public statements, it is apparent that some of the

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*The Ladykillers*]

Guinness Lite

By Steve Sailer

"THE LADYKILLERS" was the last Alec Guinness comedy from England's famed Ealing Studios, although the company's history would trace a more satisfying arc if it had been the first. A black comedy about a gang whose big heist is uncovered by their sweet old landlady who insists they return the money, the 1955 "Ladykillers" was expertly done, but it was also rather slight and not terribly funny. It would have made an admirable warm-up to Ealing's 1949 masterpiece "Kind Hearts and Coronets," in which Sir Alec famously played all eight murder victims, but coming six years later, "The Ladykillers" seemed more like an anticlimax.

So, the news was welcome that the inventive Coen Brothers were remaking "The Ladykillers" with the reliable Tom Hanks in Guinness' role as the head crook. The result, though, while a bit better than the original, is not quite up to the Coens' potential.

The Coens offer us the usual multicultural gang, something that exists mostly in movies, but they are well aware of how silly it is. Tzi Ma stands out as The General, a South Vietnamese donut-shop owner with a Hitler moustache and expertise at tunneling into the Mississippi riverboat casino's vault. Small but frighteningly stony, he seems more North than South Vietnamese. If we'd had more

allies that ferocious, we would have won the war. Marlon Wayans ("Scary Movie") takes the young Peter Sellers's role as a gun-toting henchman, but that's no loss because most of Sellers's lines were chopped out of the original. Offscreen, Sellers learned much working with his idol Guinness, but onscreen, the future master of multiple roles ("Dr. Strangelove") was forgettable.

The writers-directors re-imagine the widow as a black Southern Baptist church lady defending, with her lace doilies and lemonade, old-fashioned respectability against the "hippity-hop music" that has lured Wayans's character off the path of righteousness. It's an excellent conceit, in part because it lets a white audience (and the Coens' fans are almost all white) witness the sizable generation and gender gap in the black community between grandmothers and grandsons.

Although Hanks gets top billing, the landlady, played by the redoubtable Irma P. Hall, is the audience's surrogate. A Texas schoolteacher for 27 years, Hall (first noticed as the blind aunt in 1996's "A Family Thing," where she outshone both Robert Duvall and James Earl Jones) is creeping up on stardom at age 66. She energetically embodies the formidable dignity and queenliness that many stout old black ladies possess. She's large and in charge.

For a dozen years, Tom Hanks has been the regular guy with whom the whole world identifies. Beginning with his second-banana role in "Catch Me If You Can," however, he seems to be prudently easing himself into character leads. (Audiences prefer their leading men to look about 35, and Hanks is now 47.) Contrasting his openness with the invisibility of Guinness, whom

Peter Ustinov called a "poet of anonymity," is a challenge for Hanks, but he gets lots of practice daily due to his dedication to living a normal life with his family without hovering bodyguards or entourage. I ran into Hanks at the crowded L.A. Auto Show in January, where he blended into the crowd so self-effacingly that many attendees never noticed they were standing next to the most respected movie star in the world.

The Coens—having memorably limned Northern "you bet" laconicity in "Fargo" and Southern Foghorn Leghorn verbosity in "O Brother, Where Art Thou?"—create another post-Confederate conman. Dressed like Tom Wolfe in a cream-colored linen suit and cape, Hanks' Professor Goldthwait Higginson Dorr III, Ph.D. is a fey devotee of dead languages who dazzles his sermon-loving landlady with rhetoric.

Unfortunately, Hanks' professor isn't quite as delightful as George Clooney's Ulysses Everett McGill in "O Brother." The problem is not with Hanks's performance, but with the Coens' lines, which just aren't as amusing as you'd expect from them.

Further, the brothers' script denies us one of the pleasures of con-man movies: watching an actor put his mask on and off. Frustratingly, the persona Hanks presents to the widow he's duping is no different from the one he shows the gang he's directing.

As expected, the Coens deliver a terrific gospel-based soundtrack. Stick around through the credits for a jaw-dropping church choir performance—this show's definitely not over 'til the fat lady sings. ■

Rated R for bad language, including sexual references

BOOKS

[*Absolute Friends*, John le Carré, Little, Brown, and Company, 453 pages]

Two Against the Empire

by Justin Raimondo

THREE-QUARTERS of the way through John le Carré's latest novel it seemed highly improbable that the book could possibly live up to its reputation as an antiwar barn-burner and scathing indictment of the neoconservatives. The great majority of the text is taken up with building the foundations, setting in place the complicated machinery of character and scenario that rows along the plot-stream rather languidly, it seems, with only a few dropped hints of the author's agenda. The politics of this book are elusive, or at least not too obvious, until the very last—when the machinery is laid down, complete, and suddenly the rowboat turns into a speedboat and takes off like a shot, shocking and ultimately dazzling us with its tragic insight. Putting it down, one is inclined either to shout "Bravo!" or else let loose with an unrestrained Bronx cheer.

Whatever the reader's ideological inclinations, however, he will certainly be entertained. Here is that rarity, a political novel—that is to say, a work of fiction with an overriding didactic purpose—that works as fiction as well as polemic. Le Carré, of course, is an old hand at this sort of thing. With a few deft slashes of his pen, like ideograms that conjure up whole words in half-a-dozen brushstrokes, he can describe a scene sparsely and completely.

This gives him the space to make way for his enormously complex characterizations and the elaborately layered plot, which he navigates with the surefire certainty of an old sailor on speaking terms with Neptune. The characters are what

make any novel memorable and worthwhile, because we have to be made to care about the events chronicled therein to maintain an interest, and this goes double for *Absolute Friends*, which is, after all, 453 pages long.

We see it all from the viewpoint of Ted Mundy, misfit son of an alcoholic British major and an Irish housemaid, drifter, ex-radical, British spook, and unknown hero of the Cold War, with a failed marriage to his credit: an outsider whose ambivalence toward his employers culminates in a moment of insight, a chance to escape—and his own immolation.

Mundy is good, but Sasha is even better. Seen through Mundy's eyes, he is the eternal innocent, a threadbare academic with a slight physical deformity whose Teutonic tendency to ideate—there is no other English word—is both endearing and his own (and Mundy's) undoing.

The narrative cord that binds the action together is the relationship between Mundy—whose skepticism and moral ambivalence is temperamentally at odds with but somehow attuned

makes him, and the story he has to tell, so convincing. Le Carré's super-realism imparts a kind of surreal clarity, like a Dali painting or a desert mirage.

This hyper-clarity illuminates a plot with more twists and turns than can or ought to be summarized in a review. Suffice to say that Mundy and Sasha travel a path that leads to several way-stations on the road to a spectacular martyrdom, one that takes them from a radical commune to the East Germany of Walter Ulbricht and the Stasi. Through his employment at a cultural exchange program with the Eastern Bloc, Mundy is recruited as a spy for British intelligence—and soon finds himself running his old friend Sasha, who has infiltrated the dreaded Stasi on behalf of the West. Readers of *The American Conservative* are apt to be startled by Sasha's declaration that, if he were living in the West, he would be obliged to be spying for the other side, but this is part of how and why he made this turn—a combination of ideology and his own personal demon in the shape of his ex-Nazi Lutheran minister father, who became a fanatical

HERE IS THAT RARITY, A POLITICAL NOVEL THAT WORKS AS FICTION AS WELL AS POLEMIC. LE CARRÉ IS AN OLD HAND AT THIS SORT OF THING.

to Sasha's extravagant idealism—and his diminutive friend. These absolute friends meet and bond in the Berlin of the 1970s, where communes of radicals have taken over sections of the city and engage in constant street battles with the police. Mundy falls into it by accident: he is trying to impress a girl, and is soon marching against the Vietnam War. She dumps him anyway but advances him toward his destiny by way of a letter of introduction to the enigmatic Sasha, the young leader and in-house theoretician of a Berlin commune. Happenstance plays a major role in Mundy's life. At key points, he seems pushed by forces beyond his control, motivated by the very human needs and desires that beat in every reader's heart. That's what

Communist. That his father also turns out to have been a CIA asset adds just the right touch of sardonic irony.

The end of the Cold War, which Mundy and Sasha did so much to make possible, cuts both of them loose from their moorings. Set adrift by his sudden irrelevance and the break-up of his marriage, Mundy is haunted by the diffidence of his cold fish of a wife, Kate, a member of the British Parliament and rising young star of New Labour, and what seems like an unbridgeable distance from their son. This man with no future retreats to the past. Undertaking a pilgrimage back to his origins, he revisits the dusty fields of Pakistan and his mother's grave, then back to Berlin, where he meets Zara, a Turkish woman

who has been stranded in Germany with her young son. For the first time, he begins to make a kind of life.

The novel opens at this point and, with a long flashback in between, winds up back where it started. The reappearance of Sasha, who turns up in the audience as Mundy—now a tour guide at the castle of the legendary King Ludwig III, the mad monarch of Bavaria—leads his charges through the fabulous royal boudoir and into the Hall of Mirrors.

A book that has so far proceeded at a leisurely pace swiftly shifts gears and takes off like a rocket. Unlike Mundy, who has tried to make some semblance of normal life for himself, Sasha is ever the one-man ideological road show. Traveling about the world as a kind of itinerant academic, he meets the mysterious Dmitri, who is said to have acquired a vast fortune by business ventures charitably described as dubious in the extreme. Ah, but he's reformed, you see, and wants to remake the world in the image of his newfound vision of peace and social justice: it's as if George Soros had made his fortune gun-running and worse rather than breaking the Bank of England. Dmitri's Great Idea is to set up a Counter-University as a counterweight to the War Party. Conjuring his vision of a "core library" of books that will subvert the dominant paradigm of a rising American Imperium, Dmitri lists the works he has in mind: Noam Chomsky, John Pilger, George Monbiot, Arundhati Roy—in short, a veritable pantheon of lefties the neocons love to hate. Dmitri claims to have been motivated by his opposition to the Iraq War, and Sasha is swept off his feet by his patron's apparent sincerity as well as his munificence.

Mundy, however, is less trusting by nature, and after agreeing to work for Dmitri's organization, follows up suspicions sparked by a series of odd occurrences. He discovers the truth with the reappearance of his former boss, Nick Amory, who personifies the old-school British intelligence official, that is, a veteran of the years before his country's subordination to the American dream of empire. Amory appears throughout the

novel at crucial points. He is Mundy's compass, a lodestar that guides him through the labyrinthine hall of mirrors that is intelligence work. But even Amory's legendary steeliness seems to melt away as the heat is put on his agency—the Service—to bend to the Americans' will.

The old CIA types have been brushed aside, and a new breed, led by one O'Rourke, has bypassed the traditional organization, setting up a parallel structure of their own that will stop at nothing in the drive to start what, in the real world, has been dubbed by former CIA director James Woolsey, Norman Podhoretz, and other neoconservatives as "World War IV"—a civilizational war pitting America and Israel against most of the rest of the world.

Baffled by anomalies in the behavior of his new allies, Mundy turns to Amory, who reveals that Dmitri and O'Rourke are working not at opposite poles, but in tandem. Sasha, who duped the Stasi, has himself been duped. Amory provides Mundy and Sasha with false passports, some cash, and some strong advice: get as far away as possible before the trap is sprung.

But Amory's lifeline is thrown out too late. As Mundy returns, after meeting Amory, to the Heidelberg headquarters of

the "Counter-University"—which is under 24-hour surveillance via hidden cameras—his drunken, sleepless condition impels him to open the large crates of books that are stacked up in the hallway and discover that the "core library" featuring the works of Chomsky, Pilger, et al, is interlarded with all sorts of other quite interesting materials—works dealing with all the various ways to kill a man, bomb-making manuals, and books advocating terrorism in the name of radical Islamism and praising Osama bin Laden. Beholding the boxes of hand grenades that are included for good measure, he remembers what Sasha has said to him: "They are trying to put us into one bed. Liberals, socialists, Trotskyists, Communists, anarchists, antiglobalists, peace protesters: we are all Sympis, all pinkos. We all hate Jews and America and we are the secret admirers of Osama."

Amory is right: O'Rourke and Dmitri are working the same game, just on different sides of the track. The Counter-University is a set-up, and, as it turns out, there is no escape. The climactic raid, which is a carefully stage-managed assault on the order of the one that was launched at Waco, commences just as Sasha shows up at the scene. These two absolute friends go down—quite literally—in flames.



"Of course I can accept you for who you are.
You are someone I need to change."

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My favorite part of this book is the author's postscript: "The siege of Heidelberg, as it immediately became known to the world's media, sent shock waves through the courts of Old Europe and Washington, and a clear signal to all critics of America's policy of conservative democratic imperialism."

The scene of the assault is restricted and cleaned up, after which the media is let in and fed the manufactured storyline: a "terror cell" has been wiped out in the heart of a nation that opposed the Iraq War and, it is implied, obstructed the "war on terrorism." News reports depict Sasha as a radical guru and borderline psychopath, while Mundy is characterized as the archetypal anti-social misfit turned Muslim, and his wife is exposed as a Turkish prostitute. The smearing of Mundy and Sasha—these two who risked all for the West during the Cold War years—is accomplished with nary a ripple of dissent, except for an anonymous article by Amory posted on "a website devoted to political transparency," exposing what it calls "The Second Burning of the Reichstag."

In a note that might have been taken from the career of Richard Perle, who has recently run into trouble on account of his apparent inability to separate policymaking from profit-seeking, it turns out that O'Rourke owns a controlling interest in the company that holds the rights to the only existing video of the raid in progress—footage that is played and replayed endlessly as a keynote of the War Party's ongoing propaganda campaign.

Fiction derived from the headlines of the day is often defeated by a deadly didacticism and rarely achieves the level of art attained by an Orwell, a Huxley, or a Koestler. With the publication of *Absolute Friends*, a book that is at once a page-turner, a prophecy, and a warning, le Carré has acquired some pretty distinguished company. ■

Justin Raimondo is editorial director of Antiwar.com and author of An Enemy of the State: The Life of Murray N. Rothbard.

[*Conservatism in America Since 1930*, edited by Gregory L. Schneider, New York University Press, 450 pages]

Where the Right Went Wrong

By Joe Scotchie

WE BEGIN WITH some choice comments from this generous collection of conservative thought and opinion. First is one from the founder of modern American traditionalism:

For a century and a half, conservatives have yielded ground in a manner which, except for occasionally successful rear-guard actions, must be described as a rout.

That was Russell Kirk writing in the early 1950s. We now fast forward four decades later to 1991, to nearly identical sentiments as expressed by Samuel Francis:

American conservatism ... is a failure Virtually every cause to which conservatives have attached themselves for the past three generations has been lost, and the tide of political and cultural battle is not likely to turn anytime soon.

And finally there are Paul Weyrich's bleak thoughts, given after Bill Clinton escaped senatorial conviction in the Monica Lewinsky scandal:

[It] is impossible to ignore the fact that the United States is becoming an ideological state. The ideology of Political Correctness, which openly calls for the destruction of our traditional culture, has so gripped the body politic ... that it is even affecting the Church. It has completely taken over the academic community. It is now pervasive in the entertainment industry, and it threatens to control every aspect of our lives. ... Even now, for

the first time in their lives, people are afraid of what they say. This has never been true in the history of our country.

Conservatism in America Since 1930 is not a doom-and-gloom book, nor does the editor intend it to be that way. But as the above quotes readily suggest, it is brutally honest about the movement's current predicament. Students of modern conservatism may notice similarities in the title to George Nash's seminal 1976 book, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*. Gregory Schneider's work, however, takes the beginning of the story back to before World War II. This book, which is as much a history as an essay collection, touches on the conservatism that existed before Pearl Harbor, a conservatism that once again inspires many thinkers of the post-Cold War Right today.

The anthology's final essay, a rather bland position paper that first appeared in *Policy Review*, claims that conservatism now "constitutes a completed body of thought." In fact, this collection serves to illustrate that the conflicting worldviews that have bedeviled the movement for decades continue to rage on, despite the best efforts by *National Review*-style conservatives to purge the movement of undesirables.

For instance, both Russell Kirk and the Southern Agrarians placed great emphasis on the survival of generally non-materialistic societies. Meanwhile, such anti-statists as Albert Jay Nock and Frank Meyer championed individual liberty as conservatism's highest political goal. The editors at *Human Events*, even into the early 1950s, favored an America First-style isolationism as the best safeguard for limited government, while William F. Buckley Jr.'s *National Review* advocated an aggressive rollback foreign policy to combat Soviet imperialism. Writing in the early 1980s, Sam Francis insisted that the "localization, privatization, and decentralization of the managerial apparatus of power" should be the New Right's greatest concern.

Irving Kristol, on the other hand, tried to explain why big business is good for America, claiming that workers would rather be employed by large corporations that provide security and fringe benefits instead of toiling for those small businesses that Middle American conservatives have long viewed as a cornerstone to a humane economy.

Updating the situation, a 1989 George Will essay celebrates the success of Ronald Reagan's presidency. Another piece from the 1980s, by Gregory Wolfe, complains that the new emphasis on politics allowed opportunistic conservatives to let the liberal media define who could be acceptable spokesmen for the Right. As we know, that would turn out to be the Left's "first cousins," the triumphant neoconservatives. An essay by Dan Himmelfarb examines the profound differences between the paleoconservative and neoconservative wings. Or as Himmelfarb bluntly declares: "The principles of neoconservatism are individual liberty, self-government, and equality of opportunity; those of the paleoconservatism are religious—particularly Christian—belief, hierarchy, and prescription." For the most part that's correct, except neoconservatives may prefer power being centralized in Washington rather than allowing for genuine, 10th Amendment-style self-government.

At the end of the collection, Schneider simply asks the reader to decide if the American Right has much of a future. The book's concluding pieces are, for the most part, anything but optimistic. Schneider criticizes Newt Gingrich's Contract With America as "conservatism-lite," while also identifying Ronald Reagan as a "neoconservative himself."

Essays by Sam Francis (one entitled "Beautiful Losers") and Paul Weyrich, in a piece written as an open letter to conservative activists, represent exactly where the Serious Right stands today. What went wrong? Francis maintains that the Buckleyites failed by seeking "consensus rather than conflict" with the dominate liberal elite. The turning

point, for Francis, was the Right's support for the Vietnam War. Once the Buckleyites came out for Lyndon Johnson's war, it meant that they would soon defend "the liberal policies that were losing it." Hence, it was only a matter of time before they would give up their opposition to the Great Society's destructive domestic programs. It's an arresting thesis, but I am also reminded that the young Buckley, writing in the 1950s, expressed his desire to "acquiesce" to big government at home in order to defeat Soviet communism

abroad. Support for the Vietnam adventure was not so surprising.

A frustrated Weyrich closes his long missive by proclaiming, "I don't have all the answers or even all the questions." The "cultural secession" that Weyrich advocates—turning off the television set, giving up on public schools, boycotting Disney—is the easy part. Politics is a different story. Indeed, it is time that conservatives admit to the daunting odds that their movement has always labored under. First, there is the matter of American decadence, namely a public

A Poet's Challenge to the President's Vision of America

In Memoriam was originally inspired by a person full of hope, curiosity, and goodness, Tatiana Prosvirina, a student who died at the age of seventeen. The later poems of the collection were written in response to the reckless and immoral celebration of militarism by the Bush Administration. After the 9-11 attacks the world needed vision, humanity, and sophistication; instead it got blind, simple-minded warmongering. The Bush Administration's selfish commitment to war and wealth has been barbaric, obscene, and monstrous.


The Administration's declaration of global war on terror is an antediluvian approach to finding ways to address the world's problems of sectarian conflict, organized crime, overpopulation, poverty, hunger, despair, increasingly virulent diseases, environmental depredation, reckless depletion of global resources, and degradation of traditional cultures by the West's culture of consumption, amusement, and spectacle.

That so many Americans voted against George Bush indicates that many millions of Americans are still inspired by a romantic idealism and spirituality rooted not in blind nationalism but in the love of family and community and in a reverence for nature—God's handiwork. This is a spirituality of love, not hate, a spirituality of the sacred moment, not of an eager anticipation of Armageddon, a spirituality of sharing, not of greed, a spirituality that comes from living wisely, not simple-mindedly.

It will be the task of Tatiana's generation to restore spiritual health to an American way of life that has become obscenely wasteful and destructive of habitat, human and natural, of families and communities, and of individuals. It will be this younger generation that will reestablish America's moral authority in the world and make America a force of good for all human beings.

Purchase information:

In Memoriam (ISBN 1-4033-2708-4) can be ordered at local bookstores and Amazon.com or downloaded (\$3.95) at 1stbooks.com.



that watches nonsense like the halftime show at the Super Bowl, then complains the next day on the Bill O'Reilly radio program about all the junk that's on television.

Secondly, conservatives remain stuck in their unhappy marriage to the Republican Party. Most on the Right are satisfied with the GOP, but the reliance on just one party seems like a recipe for failure. There is, however, no well funded third party to turn to. As for the GOP itself, from the beginning the party, with some honorable exceptions, has always been devoted to the partnership of big business and big government. Nowadays, big business wants unlimited immigration to serve its cheap-labor needs. It is true that Republican congressmen are cool to President Bush's amnesty insanity. Nonetheless, those same members have failed to tackle the pressing issue of limiting all immigration, despite the fact that a survey of party regulars completed in the early 1990s found that 80 percent of all respondents favored deep cuts in legal immigration.

The old Democratic Party contained some genuine conservatives in its ranks: presidents such as Grover Cleveland; Senators Sam Ervin and Burton Wheeler, among others; plus John Vance Garner,

Franklin D. Roosevelt's first vice president, a man who by the late 1930s was in open revolt against the New Deal's big-spending ways. But since the Democrats have gone wall-to-wall liberal, smug Republicans can repeat the tired old mantra "you have no place to go" to those conservative activists that GOP bigwigs have always disliked anyway.

If that's not enough, there is the current reign of judicial tyranny. Schneider briefly mentions the controversy ignited by *First Things* editor Richard John Neuhaus, who published a symposium asking whether Supreme Court chicanery meant the end of democracy in the United States. What a disappointment the Supreme Court has been for social conservatives. Recent high-court rulings on affirmative-action cases and anti-sodomy laws have administered crushing defeats to those citizens of the old America, the people who would vote in droves for Ronald Reagan while also changing their voter registrations to the Republican Party. And as if to rub their noses in the dirt, such wholly unconstitutional decisions were in fact written by Reagan appointees. Judicial activism raises a stark question: how can conservatives hope to effect change through the democratic process when a ravenous

court system stands ready to strike down any law that does not comport to activist judges' perverse worldview? Consider only the recent decision on gay marriage in Massachusetts and the fate of California's highly popular anti-illegal immigration Proposition 187.

Conservatism in America Since 1930 is an ambitious book, chock full of the learned and provocative writing that characterized the opposition party all throughout the strife-torn 20th century. A radical decentralization of government functions is one recurring theme that runs through these essays, uniting writers as different as Albert Jay Nock, Russell Kirk, F.A. Hayek, and Barry Goldwater. Included, too, is Ronald Reagan's eloquent first inaugural address, which correctly observes that the states created the union. And from the indefatigable Francis comes this advice: conservatives should not, in fact, be "conservative" at all, but instead a "radical or revolutionary" force that seeks the "overthrow of the present elite and its replacement by themselves."

That counsel was given over 20 years ago. For now, it seems the best conservatives can do is strive for success on the survival issues: a moratorium on immigration, a non-interventionist foreign policy, the elimination of affirmative-action programs and hundreds of intrusive federal agencies, plus a trade policy that restores American sovereignty. Nearly a decade ago, in 1995, the new Republican congressional majority was headed in that direction. But efforts to abolish affirmative-action programs and limit immigration were defeated by Newt Gingrich and Richard Armey, the majority's new leadership. The GOP needs a return to the revolutionary fervor of 1994, if not for the health of the country then at least for the party's political survival. ■

Joe Scotchie is the author, most recently, of Revolt From the Heartland: The Struggle for an Authentic Conservatism (Transaction) and Street Corner Conservatism: Patrick J. Buchanan and his Times (Alexander).

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[*The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and End of the Republic*, Chalmers Johnson, Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt & Co., 320 pages]

The Sun Never Sets...

By David Isenberg

CHALMERS JOHNSON is not bullish on the future of the American Republic. In his acknowledgements he says, "This book was not easy to write. I do not like what it has to say about my country It is because I do not like stating that the United States is probably lost to militarism that this book is so heavily documented."

Johnson, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute and a professor emeritus of the University of California San Diego, covers a lot of territory in these 312 pages, from a brief survey of past empires to the history of American militarism, from government secrecy to the global network of U.S. bases and the uses of private military firms, and much more. In Johnson's words, this book is about "American militarism, its physical presence in the world, the growth of the 'special forces' as a private army of the president, and the secrecy that allows ever more militarized and secret institutions to live and thrive."

At times the jump from one topic to the next can be dizzying. One minute Johnson is writing about the recruitment needs of the all-volunteer force; the next, he's discussing depleted uranium and sexual assault against women serving in the military. The book might have benefited from treating fewer topics in greater detail. But considering the importance of his overall subject, the author can be forgiven for trying to cover too much. As it is, Johnson does a commendable job of condensing a wide array of material for the benefit of the layman. It can be a lot to take in, but the reader comes away from the experience

with a clear-eyed view of the enormous reach and impact of the American military establishment.

Above all, *The Sorrows of Empire* is an examination of the American military-basing network around the world. It is a timely book, arriving at a moment when the Pentagon is undertaking a global posture review to determine where American legions should be stationed in the future. Informal talks have been underway with Japan, South Korea, and Germany about a possible reduction of U.S. troops in their countries, and there have been negotiations, too, about establishing new bases in the former East Bloc countries of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Indeed, the former U.S. czar of Iraq, General Jay Garner, recently said that the U.S. is in Iraq to stay, too. "I think one of the most important things we can do right now is start getting basing

bases, Johnson's critical aim is true. Of course, he has, to use Pentagon jargon, a target-rich environment with which to work. As of September 2001, the United States had a total of 474,312 people deployed overseas, including military personnel, their dependents, and DoD civilians. And since the 9/11 attacks the United States has radically expanded its deployments everywhere

American forces are stationed on at least 725 foreign bases that cumulatively have a staggering plant replacement value (PRV) of \$118 billion. Johnson notes that those figures are probably underestimated, as they include only bases that are ten acres or larger or have a PRV of greater than \$10 million. They do not include the overseas listening posts of the intelligence community, nor any of the more recently established bases in the Balkans, Persian Gulf, or Central Asia. Nor, for that matter, do the

AMERICAN FORCES ARE STATIONED ON AT LEAST 725 FOREIGN BASES.

rights" in both northern and southern Iraq, Garner said. Noting how establishing U.S. naval bases in the Philippines in the early 1900s allowed the United States to maintain a "great presence in the Pacific," Garner said, "To me that's what Iraq is for the next few decades. We ought to have something there ... that gives us great presence in the Middle East. I think that's going to be necessary."

Johnson's section on Iraq, however, is probably his least useful, as it covers ground that has already been ploughed many times over. And his chapter on private military firms, which have really come to public notice since the Iraq War—with the likes of MPRI, Vinnell, DynCorp, and Kellogg, Brown & Root and its parent company Halliburton sharing the limelight—is a bit superficial and confusing as its leaps from private firms to government programs without any differentiation.

But when it comes to the book's center of gravity, American military

numbers include temporary installations that are likely to become permanent in the future, such as the airbase at Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan.

One particularly interesting point that Johnson makes—and a revealing insight into the tenacity with which the United States holds on to its bases—is that despite all of the periodic talk about reconfiguring the American military presence in the world, of that \$118 billion figure, \$78 billion is from bases that the United States acquired in World War II. Those obtained during the Korean War total another \$11.5 billion. All together, bases from those two wars account for three-quarters of the costs of the current military bases empire.

Why so many bases, especially now that the Cold War is history and there is no longer a need for containment of the Soviet Union? Bureaucratic inertia and tradition have played a large part. But as Johnson notes, another explanation is America's staggering dependence on foreign sources of oil. Considering that

back in the mid-1970s U.S. policymakers were openly discussing the possibility of seizing Persian Gulf oil fields, it should come as no surprise to anyone that petro-politics fuels the drive to empire.

The immediate and local consequences arising from this global network of U.S. bases are plain to anyone who has given even a cursory look to the news coming from places like Okinawa and South Korea. Crimes against civilians, the enlargement of the powers of the regional combatant commanders (whose authority and power now outstrip those of U.S. ambassadors), and unswerving American support for whatever repressive, authoritarian despot happens to run a country to which the United States wants access, are just a few of the regional ramifications of these bases.

The four sorrows that provide Johnson with his title, however, refer to much more long-term and dire developments, above all for Americans themselves, that follow from this empire of bases and the military-industrial complex that stands behind it. As Johnson writes:

If present trends continue, four sorrows, it seems to me, are certain to be visited on the United States. Their cumulative impact guarantees that the United States will cease to bear any resemblance to the country once outlined in our

Constitution. First there will be a state of perpetual war leading to more terrorism against Americans wherever they may be and a growing reliance on weapons of mass destruction as they try to ward off the imperial juggernaut. Second, there will be a loss of democracy and constitutional rights as the presidency fully eclipses Congress and is itself transformed from an 'executive branch' of government into something more like a Pentagonized presidency. Third, an already well-shredded principle of truthfulness will increasingly be replaced by a system of propaganda, disinformation, and glorification of war, power, and the military legions. Lastly, there will be bankruptcy, as we pour our economic resources into ever more grandiose military projects and shortchange the education, health, and safety of our fellow citizens.

Some critics have labeled this book a rant. In Johnson's case that should be taken as a badge of honor, as the truth is often characterized as a rant by those who have a vested interest in the status quo. And the truth about American military power, as documented by Johnson, is inarguable. The United States is the only country in the world that divides the globe up into unified commands—what the Pentagon calls a

Unified Command Plan—that are the provinces of modern-day military pro-consuls. If that is not a hallmark of imperial Rome, nothing is.


To be sure, there is room for debate over the form and impact of American empire. For example, despite the reality of the "footprint," as the Pentagon puts it, of U.S. military forces around the world it does not necessarily follow that the United States is an empire in the mold of all the those that went before it. Iraq, regardless of what happens in the next few years, is not going to resemble India when it was part of the British Empire.

But one might as well call the proverbial spade a spade when the likes of Charles Krauthammer, Walter Russell Mead, and Max Boot argue that the United States must use its unparalleled military power to reshape the world along the lines of American conceptions of democracy and free-market enterprise. Such commentators rarely spell out explicitly what must be done to achieve this reshaping. It is here that Johnson shines, offering plenty of concrete specifics about what the United States has done and must do in the future to maintain its empire.

In Johnson's view, the past is prologue. In his concluding chapter he writes, "from the moment we took on a role that included the permanent military domination of the world, we were on our own—feared, hated, corrupt and corrupting, maintaining 'order' through state terrorism and bribery, and given to megalomaniac rhetoric and sophistries that virtually invite the rest of the world to unite against us."

No doubt such a dark view will be dismissed by the usual crowd of status-quo cheerleaders, but there is far too much unassailable fact in the book for those who care about the future of America to ignore. ■

David Isenberg is a senior analyst with the Washington-based British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.



"You don't have to say 'hi' every time we pass each other!"

The Pain in Spain



By the time you read this it might be old hat, but the outrage in Madrid and the conservative electoral defeat three days later was the first referendum on

the war in Iraq. People made the connection. “Your war, our dead,” was the cry that greeted Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar as he paid his respects to the dead. A large protest sign showing Tony Blair, George Bush, and Jose Maria Aznar during their mini-summit just before the war began read: “Could this picture have cost 200 deaths?” Let’s face it. Not everyone is a fool. While Richard Perle and David Frum are busy bragging that they know how to win the War on Terror, innocent people going to work are doing the dying.

“Bombs won’t deter Europe,” say top Bush administrators. Is that right? I wonder to whom they spoke. Everyone I’ve come into contact with says that we’re next, meaning we, Europeans and Americans alike. It’s always the same story. A faceless official speaks to his counterpart from another country and issues the same proclamation: nothing will deter us. But the faceless ones do not ride the subways, are very well protected, and are as likely to be blown up as Frum and Perle are to volunteer for service in Iraq.

So-called top officials and civil servants get on my nerves. They’re pompous, boring, and full of themselves. What they have in common is total contempt for John Q. Public. But let’s get back to the referendum on the war.

Since the Iraqi conflict, the War on Terror has become the defining issue for every European administration. Aznar’s party has paid the electoral price for backing the Bush doctrine of non-stop war against Axis of Evil regimes. The

trouble is Aznar—a decent person—believed in it, but the people did not. Spain has been fighting ETA terrorism for 30 some years. The last thing it needed was a second front. Aznar’s personally picked successor has now joined the legion of foreign leaders who have backed an American administration and have been left out in the cold, either by a change of regime in Washington, or by local discontent.

When I spoke to my friend Charlie Glass, covering the Madrid bombing for ABC, he told me that the man on the street has decided that such an atrocity would not have happened if Senor Aznar had not taken Spain to war in Iraq. “We have no quarrel with Osama bin Laden ...” A Spanish friend of mine was more to the point. “ETA aside, the only ones who have bombed us since the civil war have been the Americans.” He was referring to the two nuclear bombs dropped by an American airplane by mistake on Spanish waters—fortunately they did not explode—sometime during the Sixties.


Tony Blair, Bill Clinton’s and George Bush’s favorite poodle, has bravely declared that we “should never be afraid to be at the front of this new war...” Easier said than done, say I, especially as I don’t have 50 Special Branch detectives protecting me 24 hours a day, do not ride in bomb-proof limos, and am not accompanied by fighter jets whenever I travel to and fro on taxpayers’ time and money. Blair is a true politician. He believes in global government, the welfare state, racial quotas, has

marshy notions about criminals, and supports the counterculture, but when it comes to waging war alongside Uncle Sam, he’s all for it. Let me tell you when he’ll change his mind about war: when a dirty bomb explodes in a London underground with hundreds perhaps thousands of victims and a loss of confidence vote ensues in the House of Commons. He will then retire to write his memoirs, protected for life by the Special Branch and cushioned against every day needs by a very healthy pension for having lied throughout his political life.

The pro-war lobby in America as well as Europe has it that radical Islam wishes to destroy the whole basis of Western society—secular democracy, individual liberty, equality before the law, toleration, and pluralism are all anathema. Of course they would say that, but it is nonsense. I have lived in Arab countries and traveled extensively throughout the Arab world. Most Arabs I’ve met simply want to live in peace. The most radical country, as well as the most anti-Semitic, is Saudi Arabia. Yet the first thing we did after 9/11 was to evacuate the bin Laden clan back to that miserable kleptocracy.

I have said it before and will say it until the day the Israelis pull out. As long as the Palestinians live under Israeli control and are humiliated daily—not to mention the killing of innocent civilians by Israeli soldiers—America will be hated by all Arabs, not just radical Islamists. I wish George W. Bush, an obviously very decent person, would read this. I mix with the people and I know what all “top” officials and pompous civil servants do not. What the Arabs do to each other is none of our business. Let’s mind our own, and we will have peace in our time. ■

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